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Abstract: The paper develops a model in which two manufacturers bid for representation 
by each of two available retailers who then choose noncooperatively which 
manufacturer's bid, if any, to accept. This framework allows for interlocking 
relationships : each manufacturer can employ both retailers and conversely each 
retailer can represent both manufacturers. In contrast to the extant literature, 
which does not provide a classificatory characterization of equilibria in such a 
setting, the present paper establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for 
every distribution configuration to arise in equilibrium. The analysis is 
performed for different cases, namely, when bids are fully contingent and 
completely unconstrained and when they are subject to various constraints. In 
each case the paper identifies the conditions under which the most efficient 
configuration can be implemented as an equilibrium. 
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1 Introduction
The paper studies equilibrium configurations of distribution channels in
an environment where two manufacturers seek to distribute their prod-
ucts through two available retailers which are capable to exert some market
power. The work is basically an extension of the Bernheim and Whinston
(1998) approach where the authors explore similar issues but in a setting
where manufacturers are locked into relationship with a single retailer. As
the authors themselves acknowledge, the assumption that only one retailer
is available is often unrealistic because manufacturers can usually find an al-
ternative retailer to distribute their products. Although there are incidences
where a single retailer acts as a ‘gatekeeper’ in a market for final consumers,1
in many industries retail markets are better described as oligopolies. For ex-
ample, in their excellent study of retailing activity Dobson and Waterson
(1999) find that “in an increasing number of markets, retailing is better
viewed as competition between small number of strategic players”.2
The present paper differs from Bernheim and Whinston (1998) in that it
treats the case when there are two competing (but possibly differentiated)
retailers. In particular, it studies the game in which two manufacturers bid
for representation by each of two available retailers who then choose non-
cooperatively which manufacturer’s bid, if any, to accept. The environment
which closely resembles to such a model is perhaps the Norwegian grocery
sector. As reported by Gabrielsen and Sorgard (1999), large grocery retailers
first decide how many brands to carry and then invite manufacturers to par-
ticipate in an auction to compete for the distribution of these brands. After
having received manufacturers’ bids, retailers finally choose manufacturers
to establish trading relationships. In another motivating case, observed by
Foros and Kind (2006), large retail chains usually form procurement alliances
or buyer groups. Rather than allow manufacturers to negotiate with each
sub-chain separately, the headquarters of each buyer group usually act as
‘gatekeepers’ to their own networks. Typically, each headquarter runs a pro-
curement auction and grants access in all-or-nothing manner to whomever
offers the best deal. As the European Commission (1996) states, the leading
Finish retailer groups, Kesko and Tuko, are organized in this way.
Building on the approach of Bernheim and Whinston, I allow bids to
be contingent on a particular distribution configuration. The motivation is
1Specifically, Bernheim and Whinston (1997) apply their analysis to the case, Standard
Fashion Company v. Magrane-Houstoun Company (1922), where Magrane-Houstoun was
a single distributor of dress patterns.
2Dobson and Waterson (1999), page 138.
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that firms will likely renegotiate their contract terms in case some expected
trading links have not been actually established. Letting each manufacturer
submit a bid for every possible configuration can be viewed as a “short-cut”
of such “reactive renegotiation”.
In such a setting, I first derive necessary and sufficient conditions for
every possible distribution configuration to arise in equilibrium. I then use
these conditions to examine whether the most efficient configuration, defined
as the one which generates the greatest total surplus, can be an equilibrium
outcome. The analysis is performed for the case when manufacturers submit
any bids (including negative ones) and for the case when bids are subject to
various constraints.
When bids are unconstrained, I find that any distribution configuration,
except monopoly and foreclosure ones,3 can always be implemented as an
equilibrium. Monopoly can never be an equilibrium while foreclosure can be
equilibrium only if it generates total surplus which is greater than the one
generated by exclusive dealing.4 Moreover, in the most preferred equilibria,
except foreclosure ones, manufacturers jointly earn all surplus from the trade
while in all foreclosure equilibria they earn zero.
Thus, if one believes that only Pareto-undominated equilibria (from the
viewpoint of manufacturers) are likely to arise, then foreclosure will proba-
bly never be observed in such an environment. For its occurrence in this case
must be due to a coordination failure among manufacturers. This implies a
subtle difference between my results and those of Bernheim and Whinston.
In particular, they demonstrate that the form of distribution configuration
that maximize total surplus is always a Pareto-undominated equilibrium
for manufacturers. Consequently, in their setup the market outcome is al-
ways efficient. Here, in contrast, the market outcome is inefficient whenever
monopoly or foreclosure generates the greatest total surplus. This is because
monopoly is never an equilibrium while foreclosure, whenever it can arise,
is always a Pareto-dominated equilibrium for manufacturers.
The intuition for these results is as follows. A particular distribution
configuration can be sustained in equilibrium only if no manufacturer finds
it profitable to deviate by inducing a different distribution configuration.
When bids are fully contingent, manufacturers can easily deter all devia-
tions to all configurations, in which at least one retailer acts as a common
3A monopoly configuration is the one in which trading relationship is established be-
tween only one manufacturer and one retailer. A foreclosure configuration is the one in
which one manufacturer is excluded from the market.
4An exclusive dealing configuration is the one in which each manufacturer distributes
its product through one retailer only.
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agent. For it suffices that they demand sufficiently high payments from
this retailer, so that it will never accept to distribute the products of both
manufacturers. Next, when negative bids are allowed, all deviations to all
(remaining) configurations, in which each retailer carries one product only,
can also be deterred. For it suffices that one manufacturer actually promise
to pay each retailer for the exclusive distribution of its product so that
the other manufacturer will never find it profitable to outbid these offers.
The fact that all deviations can be deterred in this way in turn implies
that any distribution configuration (but foreclosure and monopoly) can be
implemented as an equilibrium. Moreover, in any such equilibrium (again
except foreclosure and monopoly) retailers earn zero. This may seem some-
what surprising, given that they eventually face positive offers (for at least
exclusive representation). The reason is that manufacturers now exploit
mis-coordination among retailers. In particular, they induce them to play
the game that has as a pure-strategy equilibrium only the outcome where
both retailers are worse off.
In contrast, under foreclosure manufacturers compete in a Bertrand-type
fashion to sign up both retailers into exclusive relationship. Consequently,
in order to win both auctions, each manufacturer has to leave all bilateral
surplus to each retailer. In addition, since in any such equilibrium a man-
ufacturer always contemplates the possibility to employ one retailer only,
it can exist only if bilateral surplus is greater under foreclosure than under
exclusive dealing.
Given the assumptions that bids are fully contingent and totally uncon-
strained play a critical role for the sustainability of equilibria, it is natural
to ask how the results would alter if they were subject to some vertical re-
straints. Guided by this intuition, I consider two types of restraints. In the
first case, I assume that manufacturers face limited liability and therefore
cannot submit negative bids. Not surprisingly, limited liability is found to
further impede the implementation of the most efficient configuration as an
equilibrium. In particular, any configuration, in which at least one retailer
acts as a common agent, will not necessarily arise in equilibrium even if it
generates the greatest total surplus while the foreclosure configuration can be
the unique equilibrium even if it is inefficient. Intuitively, when manufac-
turers cannot make payments to retailers, it becomes more difficult to deter
foreclosure deviations. As a result, in order that a given configuration be
an equilibrium, it must generate total surplus which sufficiently exceeds the
one under foreclosure.
In the second case, I consider the situation where manufacturers make
less contingent offers. This can happen because fully contingent offers may
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be found anticompetitive or because the parties involved in a contract may
not know the nature of the relationship between the other parties. Intu-
itively, less contingent offers reduce manufacturers’ ability to deter devia-
tions. As a result, manufacturers may obtain lower equilibrium payoffs and
in some circumstances may not even be able to sustain the most efficient
configuration as an equilibrium. Furthermore, with less contingent offers
manufacturers have less instruments to induce retailers to make decisions in
favor of manufacturers. This may give rise to the situation where even the
most efficient configuration cannot be implemented as the unique continua-
tion equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the rele-
vant economic literature. Section 3 introduces the framework and considers
as a benchmark the case when only one retailer is available and manufac-
turers are constrained by limited liability. Section 4 treats the case of two
retailers and derives necessary and sufficient conditions for every distribu-
tion configuration to arise in equilibrium subject to manufacturers’ limited
liability constraint. Building on this analysis, it also derives similar condi-
tions in the case when negative bids are allowed. Using the results obtained,
it identifies the circumstances under which the most efficient configuration
can be an equilibrium. Section 5 discusses similar issues but in a context of
less contingent offers. Section 6 asks how the allocation of the bargaining
power between manufacturers and retailers affect the implementation of the
most efficient configuration in equilibrium. Section 7 concludes.
2 Review of the literature
The economic literature on modeling an environment where both the up-
stream and downstreammarkets are concentrated is still in its infantry stage.
A notable exception is the case where one of these markets is effectively mo-
nopolized. In this context the literature typically addresses the questions
of whether exclusion is possible and whether an equilibrium outcome is effi-
cient from the viewpoint of firms. It turns out that even in this admittedly
simplified setting no general conclusion can be drawn and the answer usually
depends on allocation of bargaining power between the parties as well as on
the nature of the contracts they sign. For example, Mathewson and Winter
(1987) study the situation where two rival manufacturers distribute their
products through a monopolistic retailer. Assuming that bargaining power
is entirely upstream and restricting the set of feasible contracts to linear
wholesale prices, they find that exclusion can arise as the unique equilib-
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rium outcome. In contrast, by allowing for the efficient contracts such as
(non-contingent) two-part tariffs, in a similar setting Bernheim and Whin-
ston (1998) show that exclusion does not occur5 and firms can achieve the
profits of the vertically integrated structure.6
Likewise, in the other extreme case where a single manufacturer sells
its product to two possibly differentiated retailers, downstream foreclosure
may or may not arise. In this setup, Marx and Shaffer (2006) assume that
retailers have all the bargaining power and offer non-contingent “three-part
tariffs”.7 Their main result is that in all equilibria only one retailer purchases
from the manufacturer. The exclusion is inefficient because the overall joint
profit of the manufacturer-retailer pair is less than the joint profit that
potentially could have been obtained if both retailers had purchased from the
manufacturer.8 Building on their analysis but instead allowing for contingent
three-part tariffs, Rey et al. (2005) reach strikingly different conclusions.
In particular, they show that there exist equilibria in which both retailers
purchase from the manufacturer and in which firms can achieve the industry-
wide monopoly profit.9
While most of the existing literature focuses on the case where monopoly
is either upstream or downstream, relatively few papers treat the case where
competition exists at both levels and, in addition, retailers are capable to
exert some market power vis-à-vis manufacturers.10 Dobson and Waterson
5To be more precise, although exclusive equilibria exist, they are Pareto-dominated by
common agency equilibria.
6Note, finally, that if the retailer had instead the initiative to make offers, it would
prefer to contract with both manufacturers. In which case it wouls set the transfer price
equal to the costs of production and thus sustain the industry monopoly outcome.
7A three-part tariffs contract includes an upfront payment (slotting allowance), which is
paid by the manufacturer regardless of whether the retailer will buy a product afterwards,
and a conditional fixed fee which is paid by the retailer only if it actually buys a product.
8The authors also consider a situation where retailers offer non-contingent two-part tar-
iffs. In which case they find that if the offers are made simultaneously then no pure-strategy
equilibrium exists. However, if the they are made sequentially then in any equilibrium
both retailers purchase from the manufacturer.
9As the authors notice, if instead the manufacturer had all the bargaining power then
efficiency could also be restored even without slotting allowances or conditional fees. In
which case, it could charge wholesale prices above marginal costs, so as to ensure that con-
sumer prices be equal to monopoly levels, and recover any remaining retail profit through
fixed fees. It is important, however, that this result is obtained under the assumption
that contracts are publicly observed. Hart and Tirole (1990) instead assume that they are
privately negotiated and find that the resulting equilibrium is inefficient. This idea has
been further explored by O’Brien and Shaffer (1992) and McAfee and Schwartz (1994).
10The situation where there exists both upstream and downstream competition has been
extensively studied in the literature of vertical restrains. Representative examples include
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(2001) are perhaps the first to explore this issue. They develop a model
where two differentiated manufacturers distribute their products through
two differentiated retailers. The market power of retailers stems from the
fact that they are allowed to choose whether to enter into exclusive relation-
ship with a manufacturer.11 In the absence of exclusive dealing, wholesale
contracts are restricted to linear transfer prices while exclusive dealing con-
tracts instead involve two-part tariffs. This clearly implies that the benefit
from establishing exclusive dealing relationship is that it allows the parties
to avoid the double marginalization problem while the cost is that both
the retailer and the manufacturer have to limit their product ranges. Not
surprisingly, an exclusive dealing equilibrium arises only if manufacturers’
products and retailers’ services are slightly differentiated. Otherwise, an
equilibrium involves both retailers distributing the products of both manu-
facturers.
Using a similar framework but focusing on non-contingent two-part tar-
iffs, Rey and Verge (2004) study the possibility of double common agency to
arise in equilibrium.12 Although in their model manufacturers make take-
or-leave-it offers, still retailers are capable to exert some market power by
refusing to carry the manufacturer’s brand. The authors find that the full
analysis in such a setup is technically complicated and neither derive prices
nor establish conditions for the existence of a double common agency equi-
librium.13 Instead they show that such an equilibrium does not always exist
despite the fact that there is a positive demand for each manufacturer’s
product at each store.
Bonanno and Vicker (1988), Rey and Stiglitz (1988, 1995), Lin (1990), O’Brien and Shaffer
(1993), Besanko and Perry (1994), Moner et al (2004). It is important, however, that in
all these papers manufacturers are assumed to have all the bargaining power and thus
effectively impose various restraints on retailers.
11 In their paper, exclusive trading implies that a retailer purchases the product only
from one manufacturer and this manufacturer in turn distributes its product only through
this retailer.
12 In a double common agency situation each manufacturer uses both retailers, and
conversely each retailer carries both brands.
13 Intuitively, the complexity of the analysis stems from the following fact. When offers
are non-negotiated and products are substitutable, a retailer can gain more by distribut-
ing one product only. This implies that manufacturers must leave a rent to retailers to
convince them to carry their products. Since in any double common agency equilibrium
manufacturers seek to minimize these rents then under some conditions it can be quite
easy for a deviating manufacturer to sign up one or two retailers into exclusive dealing
arrangements. This allows a manufacturer to deviate in many different ways and, as a
result of the multiplicity of possible deviations, such an equilibrium there does not always
exist.
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More recently Moner et al. (2005) slightly modify the approach of Dob-
son and Waterson (2001). In their model retailers are identical and, after
manufacturers have publicly announced their linear wholesale prices, retail-
ers non-cooperatively choose to carry none, one or two brands. Assuming
that in the market for final consumers retailers compete à la Cournot, the
authors find that in equilibrium both retailers choose to be multi-brand
sellers for all degrees of product differentiation.14
The present paper differs from the extant literature mainly in two re-
spects. First, it treats the joint surplus earned by manufacturer(s) and
retailer(s) as exogenously given. The advantage of such an approach is that
it can be applied to a variety of economic environments. For example, the
results do not depend on a particular type of contracts signed by manufac-
turers and retailers, on whether retailers compete in prices or quantities, or
whether there are economies of scale in production or distribution. Conse-
quently, I can make predictions about the structure of an industry under
quite general conditions. However, the cost of this approach is that it does
not allow us to fully evaluate the welfare consequences of a particular dis-
tribution configuration arising in equilibrium.
The second difference from the aforementioned papers is that I allow con-
tracts to be contingent on a particular distribution configuration. Besides
the fact that this assumption seems more realistic in an environment where
firms can renegotiate their contract terms, in addition, it allows manufac-
turers to sharply limit the scope for possible deviations. Thus, in contrast
to Rey and Verge (2004) where the main difficulty stems from multiplicity
of deviations, here this problem is considerably simplified. As a result, I
am capable to obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for every possible
distribution configuration to arise in equilibrium.
3 Framework
Consider an environment where two upstream firms (manufacturers h, k ∈
{A,B}) compete for representation by two downstream firms (retailers i, j =
1, 2).
Let S = {∅,MA,MB,MA&MB} denote the set of possible representa-
tions available to retailer i and si denote an element from S. If si = ∅
then retailer i represents neither of the manufacturers, if si = Mh then it
14 In the paper the authors also study the case when the profitability of brands differ.
In particular, when it diverges significantly, an equilibrium may involve both retailer
distributing the most profitable brand only.
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represents manufacturer h and if si = MA&MB then it represents both.
Any pair (s1, s2) defines a distribution configuration. Then sixteen different
distribution configurations arise. To simplify the matters, I assume that
manufacturers and retailers are equally efficient. Therefore, by symmetry,
only six of them need to be distinguished which are shown on figure 1 and
characterized below.
• Common agency : one retailer is inactive while the other retailer rep-
resents both manufacturers and thus acts as a multi-product monop-
olist on the downstream market. This refers to the (MA&MB, ∅) and
(∅,MA&MB) configurations.
• Monopoly: one manufacturer and one retailer are inactive while the
other manufacturer and the other retailer enter in a trading rela-
tionship. This refers to the (Mh, ∅) and (∅,Mh) configurations for
h = A,B.
• Exclusive dealing: each retailer represents one manufacturer only. This
refers to the (MA,MB) and (MB,MA) configurations.
• Mixed configuration: one retailer represents one manufacturer while
the other retailer represents both. This refers to the (MA&MB,MA) ,
(MA&MB, MB), (MA,MA&MB) and (MB,MA&MB) configurations.
• Full competition or double common agency: each retailer represents
both manufacturers and thus acts as a multi-brand dealer. This refers
to the (MA&MB,MA&MB) configuration.
• Foreclosure: one manufacturer is inactive while the other one is repre-
sented by both retailers. This refers to the (MA,MA) and (MB,MB)
configurations.
Building on the approach of Bernheim and Whinston (1998), the interac-
tion between manufactures and retailers is modeled as the three-stage game
G.
Stage 1. Each manufacturer h ∈ {A,B} announces a menu Σh.All menus
are simultaneous and public and each menu consists of “required payments”
which each retailer i = 1, 2 pays to manufacturer h in the event it accepts
to represent manufacturer h. Each payment corresponds to a particular dis-
tribution configuration and therefore Σh consists of:
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• common agency payments UCAhi for i = 1, 2 in the event retailer i
chooses to represent both manufacturers while retailer j = i chooses
to represent none,
• monopoly payments UMhi for i = 1, 2 in the event retailer i chooses to
represent manufacturer h only while retailer j = i chooses to represent
none,
• exclusive dealing payments UEDhi for i = 1, 2 in the event retailer i
chooses to represent manufacturer h only while retailer j = i chooses
to represent manufacturer k only,
• mixed payments: UMXhi in the event retailer i = 1, 2 chooses to repre-
sent manufacturer h only while retailer j = i chooses to represent both,
uMXhi (or v
MX
hi ) in the event retailer i = 1, 2 chooses to represent both
manufacturers and retailer j = i chooses to represent manufacturer h
(or k),
• competitive payments UChi for i = 1, 2 in the event both retailers choose
to represent both manufacturers,
• foreclosure payments UFhi for i = 1, 2 in the event both retailers choose
to represent manufacturer h only.
One way to think about these payments is that they are demanded for
the establishment of trading relationship with a manufacturer before the
parties sign any contract. Throughout, I shall assume that manufacturers
are constrained by limited liability and thus cannot offer negative payments.
As it will be clear later, if negative payments were allowed the analysis would
be slightly modified. This, however, would lead to different conclusions and
therefor I shall discuss this case as well.
Stage 2. Each retailer i = 1, 2 chooses an element si ∈ S. All retailers’
decisions are simultaneous and public and after they have been made a
distribution configuration, (s1, s2) , is realized.
Stage 3. Each retailer signs a contract with each manufacturer that it
has chosen to represent. Similarly to Bernheim and Whinston, I treat the
process of this stage as a “black box” and assume that the joint surplus that
the concerned parties earn through the sales in a given outlet is ΠCA under
common agency, ΠM under monopoly, ΠED under exclusive dealing, ΠC un-
der full competition, ΠF under foreclosure, ΠMXAB if a retailer contracts with
both manufacturers and ΠMX if a retailer contracts with one manufacturer
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in either mixed configuration. Finally, each retailer i pays the required pay-
ment(s) that correspond to the realized distribution configuration, (s1, s2) .
If it has chosen si = ∅ then it pays nothing and earns zero.
An important element of the model is that in the second stage retail-
ers make their decisions of which, if any, manufacturer to represent non-
cooperatively. This is a simple way to capture the fact that there is down-
stream competition for manufacturer’s representation. To formalize the
matters, I denote by g(ΣA,ΣB) the second stage continuation game be-
tween retailers, after manufacturers have proposed the menus ΣA and ΣB
in stage one. Taking into account the outcomes of stage three, Table 1 rep-
resents g(ΣA,ΣB) where each cell of the matrix gives the retailers’ payoffs
(the upper line in each cell shows retailer 1’s payoff) in the corresponding
distribution configuration.
A key assumption underlying the model is that manufacturers are al-
lowed to condition their payments upon the distribution configuration. This
is a simple way to capture the fact that trading parties will likely renegotiate
their contract terms in response to a change of the market environment. Let-
ting each manufacturer to propose a payment for every possible distribution
configuration is a way to model this “reactive renegotiation”.
Another crucial assumption is that the manufacturers’ offers are public.
It greatly simplifies the equilibrium analysis of g(ΣA,ΣB) and allows us to
avoid technical difficulties related to the definition of reasonable conjectures
in the event of unexpected offers. On the other hand, the observability of
retailers’ acceptance decisions is not important because in any equilibrium
each retailer (and therefore each manufacturer) can correctly anticipate the
behavior of its rival in the second stage and therefore the parties will expect
to obtain the same payoffs in the subsequent contracting stage.
Before proceeding to solve the game G, consider as a benchmark the case
of a single retailer.
3.1 Benchmark: a single retailer
When a single retailer is available, only four market configurations are possi-
ble, i.e., common, monopoly (or exclusive) and null representations. There-
fore the contingent menu Σh boils down to the contingent pair (U
M
h , U
CA
h )
for h ∈ {A,B}.
ASSUMPTION 1. ΠCA < 2ΠM .
This assumption implies that when products are substitutes, a marginal
contribution to total surplus from a sale of a product is larger when this
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product is sold alone than when both products are sold.
Though the contingent offers are now constrained to be non-negative,
the equilibrium analysis is similar to the one performed in Bernheim and
Whinston (1998) (i.e., where negative offers are permitted). Hence, I omit
the details and state the final result.15
PROPOSITION 1.
(i) There always exist two exclusive dealing equilibria where either man-
ufacturer is active. In both cases the retailer earns ΠM while manufacturers
earn zero.
(ii) Common agency equilibria exist if and only if ΠCA ≥ ΠM . In which
case both manufacturers prefer the equilibrium in which each of them earns
its marginal contribution to total surplus, ΠCA−ΠM , while the retailer earns
2ΠM −ΠCA.
From the proposition it follows that, even when manufacturers are bound
by limited liability, the form of representation is chosen to maximize the joint
surplus of the manufacturers and the retailer. In particular, common agency
will necessarily arise whenever it generates the greatest joint surplus. To
better understand this result, recall that when manufacturers seek to imple-
ment common agency as an equilibrium they pursue two goals. The first is
to extract more rent from a common agent and the second is to enhance the
sustainability of the equilibrium. When one retailer is available, these tasks
are interrelated: by raising monopoly offers, manufacturers reduce the rent
attributed to the retailer, however, by doing so, they also increase the scope
for monopoly deviations. In the most preferred equilibrium manufacturers
resolve this trade-off by choosing both monopoly and common agency offers
to be non-negative and equal to ΠCA −ΠM . Therefore, the limited liability
constraint has no impact on the equilibrium offers and, as a consequence,
on the condition governing the existence of common agency equilibria.
4 Solving the model
I use subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium as an equilibrium concept and there-
fore solve the game G in a recursive manner. In stage two retailers choose
which, if any, manufacturer to represent while anticipating the consequences
of their choices in stage three. Since they make their decisions non-cooperatively,
the configuration that arises in stage two must be an equilibrium of the corre-
sponding retailer game. In stage one, manufacturers choose their contingent
15The proof is available upon request.
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offers to maximize their payoffs while anticipating the effects of their actions
on the subsequent play of the game.
To formalize the matters, the pair of menus (ΣA,ΣB) gives rise to the
(s1, s2) configuration and constitutes an equilibrium of G if it satisfies the
following conditions:
(i) (s1, s2) is the unique pure-strategy equilibrium in g(ΣA,ΣB).
16
(ii) No manufacturer h ∈ {A,B} can gain by offering a menu Σ˜h = Σh.
Any such deviation implies that manufacturer h induces the game g(Σ˜h,Σk)
which has some configuration, (s˜1, s˜2), as a pure-strategy equilibrium.
17
The present model can have multiple equilibria. Following Bernheim
and Whinston (1998), I restrict attention on the equilibria that are most
preferred by manufacturers. Similarly to their work, I establish conditions,
under which each of the aforementioned distribution configurations arises in
equilibrium of G, and thus make conclusions regarding the occurrence of the
efficient form of equilibrium representation.
4.1 Common agency equilibria
Since retailers are identical, then for the sake of concreteness suppose that
manufacturers wish to implement the (MA&MB, ∅) configuration as a con-
tinuation equilibrium. Denote by ΣCAh a contingent menu offered by manu-
facturer h and let us start with the conditions that ensure that (MA&MB, ∅)
is an equilibrium in the corresponding retailer game g(ΣCAA ,Σ
CA
B ).
Since the second retailer is available, then it must be that if retailer 1
chooses common representation, retailer 2 chooses to represent no manufac-
turer, i.e.,
UMXA2 , U
MX
B2 > Π
MX and UCA2 + U
C
B2 > Π
C . CAinact
Conversely, if retailer 2 chooses to be inactive, retailer 1 must represent both
manufacturers, i.e.,
ΠCA − UCAA1 − U
CA
B1 ≥ max{0,Π
M − UMA1,Π
M − UMB1}.
Note that in any equilibrium the above condition cannot hold with strict
inequality because manufacturer h could then profitably deviate by slightly
16The uniqueness is required in order to avoid the ambiguity related to the selection of
a particular equilibrium in case of multiple continuation equilibria in g(ΣA,ΣB).
17Deviations which lead to multiplicity of continuation equilibria can be omitted. As
I will show below, this is because a deviating manufacturer can always ensure that the
continuation equilibrium which yields the highest payoff is unique.
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increasing UCAh . In other words, retailer 1 must be indifferent between ac-
cepting both manufacturers’ offers, only one or none, i.e.,
ΠCA − UCAA1 − U
CA
B1 = max{0,Π
M − UMA1,Π
M − UMB1}. CA
act
The next step is to consider possible deviations by manufacturers. For
this purpose I assume (and show in the Appendix that this is indeed the
case) that ΣCAA and Σ
CA
B induce the retailer game g(Σ
CA
A ,Σ
CA
B ) that has
(MA&MB, ∅) as the unique pure-strategy equilibrium.
Foreclosure deviations. Suppose that manufacturer h wishes to de-
stroy common agency and instead induce both retailers to distribute exclu-
sively its product. In which case it announces the menu Σ˜Fh such that the
corresponding continuation game g(Σ˜Fh ,Σ
CA
k ) has the (Mh,Mh) configura-
tion as an equilibrium. The latter is possible only if the following conditions
hold:
ΠF − U˜Fhi ≥ max{0,Π
ED − UEDki ,Π
MX
AB − u˜
MX
hi − v
MX
ki },
for i = 1, 2. These conditions imply that if retailer i chooses to represent
manufacturer h then so does retailer j.
Note that, by setting u˜MXhi = ∞, manufacturer h can only facilitate its
foreclosure deviations because, by doing so, it reduces the set of alterna-
tive representations available to retailer i. Hence, the necessary conditions
governing the possibility of such deviations can be written as follows:
U˜Fhi ≤ min{Π
F ,ΠF − (ΠED − UEDki )}, DEV
F
hi
for i = 1, 2.
In fact, DEVFh1 and DEV
F
h2 are also sufficient conditions. To show
this, suppose that manufacturer A announces the following menu Σ˜FA of
contingent payments:18
• U˜MXA2 < Π
MX so that (MA&MB, ∅) is no longer an equilibrium because
an inactive retailer is now willing to accept an offer of manufacturer
A.
18Although there can be other deviation strategies that lead to foreclosure, it is not
important because they only differ in the way the common agency equilibrium is destroyed.
A common and essential feature of all such strategies is that the DEVFi constraints must
be satisfied for i = 1, 2.
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• u˜MXAi = ∞ and U˜
F
Ai satisfies DEV
F
Ai for i = 1, 2 so that (MA,MA)
becomes instead an equilibrium.
• The other payments of Σ˜FA coincide with their counterparts of Σ
CA
A .
By construction, (MA,MA) is an equilibrium of g(Σ˜
F
A,Σ
CA
B ).Moreover, it
is the unique equilibrium, given that (MA&MB, ∅) is the unique equilibrium
of g(ΣCAA ,Σ
CA
B ).
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Exclusive dealing deviations. Suppose now that manufacturer h de-
viates by inducing as a continuation equilibrium the configuration in which
retailer i distributes exclusively its product while retailer j distributes ex-
clusively the product of its rival. Denote by Σ˜EDh the menu announced by
manufacturer h in this case. First of all, in order that such deviations be
possible, retailer j must be willing to accept an exclusive offer of manufac-
turer k, i.e., it must be UEDkj ≤ Π
ED. In that case, the configuration under
study can be an equilibrium in the retailer game g(Σ˜EDh ,Σ
CA
k ) only if the
following condition holds:
ΠED − U˜EDhi ≥ max{0,Π
F − UFki,Π
MX
AB − u
MX
ki − v˜
MX
hi }.
That is, retailer i must find it profitable to represent exclusively manu-
facturer h. As before, manufacturer h can only facilitate its exclusive dealing
deviations by setting v˜MXhi =∞. Therefore, the necessary conditions for such
deviations to be possible are as follows:
U˜EDhi ≤ min{Π
ED,ΠED − (ΠF − UFki)}, DEV
ED
hi
and
UEDkj ≤ Π
ED, DEVED
where i = j.
I now show thatDEVEDhi andDEV
ED are also sufficient conditions. For
this, suppose UEDB2 ≤ Π
ED and consider the following menu Σ˜EDA announced
by manufacturer A:20
19This is because, by construction, Σ˜FA does not alter the retailers’ payoffs in all other
configurations but in (MA&MB,MA) , (MA,MA&MB) and (MA,MA) . Consequently,
if some configuration (except those three) was not an equilibrium in the former game
g(ΣCAA ,Σ
CA
B ) it cannot be an equilibrium in the new game g(Σ˜
F
A,Σ
CA
B ) either. Finally,
neither (MA&MB ,MA) nor (MA,MA&MB) can be an equilibrium of g(Σ˜
F
A,Σ
CA
B ) because
u˜MXAi =∞ for i = 1, 2.
20See footnote for a similar argument.
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• U˜CAA1 = ∞ and U˜
M
A1 ≤ min{0, U
M
B1} so that (MA&MB, ∅) is no longer
an equilibrium because retailer 1, acting before as a common agent,
now prefers to represent exclusively manufacturer A.
• U˜FA2 = u˜
MX
A2 = ∞ so that retailer 2 now rejects to deal with manu-
facturer A and instead chooses to represent manufacturer B (since by
supposition UEDB2 ≤ Π
ED) if it anticipates that retailer 1 will represent
exclusively manufacturer A. v˜MXA1 = ∞ and U˜
ED
A1 satisfies DEV
ED
A1 .
Taken together, these conditions imply that (MA,MB) is now an equi-
librium.
• The other payments of Σ˜EDA coincide with their counterparts of Σ
CA
A .
As in the case of foreclosure, one can check that (MA,MB) is the unique
equilibrium in g(Σ˜EDA ,Σ
CA
B ), given that (MA&MB, ∅) was the unique equi-
librium of g(ΣCAA ,Σ
CA
B ).
Monopoly deviations. Since any such deviation implies that one re-
tailer must be inactive, it is possible only if this retailer rejects the exclusive
dealing offer of a rival manufacturer, i.e., it must be
UEDhi > Π
ED DEVMki
for at least some h and some i. If the above condition hold, then man-
ufacturer k can always undertake monopoly deviations and earn at most
min{ΠM , UMhj }. To see this, suppose, for example, that U
ED
B2 > Π
ED and
consider the following menu Σ˜MA announced by manufacturer A:
• U˜CAA1 =∞ and U˜
M
A1 ≤ min{Π
M , UMB1} so that (MA&MB, ∅) is no longer
an equilibrium because retailer 1, acting before as a common agent,
now prefers to represent exclusively manufacturer A.
• U˜FA2 = u˜
MX
A2 = ∞ so that retailer 2 now rejects to represent either
manufacturer (recall that UEDB2 > Π
ED) if it anticipates that retailer 1
will represent exclusively manufacturer A. Taken together, these con-
ditions imply that (MA, ∅) is now an equilibrium.
• The other payments of Σ˜MA coincide with their counterparts of Σ
CA
A .
One can check that, by deviating in this way, manufacturer A induces the
game g(Σ˜MA ,Σ
CA
B ) that has (MA, ∅) as the unique pure-strategy equilibrium
in which it earns U˜MA1 ≤ min{Π
M , UMB1}.
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Deviations to common agency, double common agency and
mixed configurations. Manufacturers can fully deter all such deviations
by simply destroying common agency in all these configurations. That is,
each manufacturer h ∈ {A,B} must then set
vMXhi = u
MX
hi = U
C
hi = U
CA
h2 =∞,
for i = 1, 2.
So far I have shown that all deviations but possibly those to foreclosure,
exclusive dealing and monopoly could in principle be deterred. The following
lemma states the most effective way to deter the remaining deviations.
LEMMA 1. When manufacturers are constrained by limited liability, the
most effective way to deter deviations to foreclosure, exclusive dealing and
monopoly is as follows:
(i) If ΠED ≤ ΠF then each manufacturer h ∈ {A,B} must set UEDhi = 0,
UFhi < Π
F − ΠED and UMhi ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2. In which case monopoly and
exclusive dealing deviations are impossible while foreclosure deviations yield
at most 2(ΠF −ΠED).
(ii) If 0 < ΠED − ΠF ≤ 2ΠF then the lowest payoff that each manu-
facturer can earn by deviating is ΠED − ΠF . This would be the case if, for
example, each manufacturer h ∈ {A,B} set UFhi = 0, U
M
hi ≥ 0, U
ED
hi < Π
ED
for i = 1, 2 and UEDhi < Π
ED−ΠF for at least some i. In that case monopoly
and foreclosure deviations are impossible while exclusive dealing deviations
yield at most ΠED −ΠF .
(iii) If 2ΠF < ΠED −ΠF then each manufacturer h ∈ {A,B} must set
UFhi ≥ 0, U
ED
hi > Π
ED and UMhi ≤ min{Π
M , 2ΠF} for i = 1, 2. In which case
exclusive dealing deviations are impossible while monopoly and foreclosure
deviations yield at most 2ΠF .
Proof. See the Appendix.
I now proceed to establishing necessary conditions for the existence of
common agency equilibria. Suppose that ΠED ≤ ΠF then, by lemma 1,
the most effective way to deter all deviations implies that only foreclosure
deviations are possible and in that case a deviating manufacturer earns at
most 2(ΠF −ΠED). Since the maximal joint payoff that manufacturers can
obtain in any equilibrium is ΠCA, then such equilibria can exist only if
ΠCA ≥ 4
(
ΠF −ΠED
)
. (1)
Suppose now that ΠED > ΠF . As lemma 1 implies, in seeking to mini-
mize the gain from deviations, manufacturers choose between two alterna-
tives: they can allow either exclusive dealing deviations or foreclosure and
17
monopoly deviations only. Moreover, one should remember that, whenever
monopoly deviations are important, manufacturers cannot extract all re-
tailer’s surplus in equilibrium, as it follows from CAact. Consequently, in
that case monopoly offers must be chosen to resolve the trade-off between
the rent extraction and the deterrence of deviations.
Consider, first, the case when 2ΠF ≥ ΠM . In this case monopoly devi-
ations, even if they are possible, effectively play no role because foreclosure
deviations are more profitable. By lemma 1, whenever a manufacturer can
deviate to foreclosure it can earn 2ΠF . On the other hand, whenever it can
deviate to exclusive dealing it can earn at most (ΠED − ΠF ). Hence, the
necessary condition for the existence of common agency equilibria can be
written as follows:
ΠCA ≥ 2min
{
2ΠF ,ΠED −ΠF
}
.
Consider now the case 2ΠF < ΠM which implies that, whenever monopoly
deviations are allowed, they may be chosen by manufacturers. In order to
reduce the gain from such deviations, manufacturers should lower monopoly
offers. However, by doing so, they leave more rent to the common agent
and thus reduce their equilibrium payoffs. As proposition 1 states, the most
effective way to resolve this trade-off is to set both monopoly and common
agency offers equal to ΠCA−ΠM . Given that foreclosure deviations are also
possible and yield at most 2ΠF , no manufacturer will undertake such devi-
ations only if ΠCA − ΠM ≥ 2ΠF . Finally, since manufacturers can always
adopt the strategies which allow only exclusive dealing deviations, in this
case such equilibria can exist only if
ΠCA ≥ min
{
2(ΠED −ΠF ),ΠM + 2ΠF
}
.
Taken all results together, the necessary condition for the existence of
common agency equilibria can be stated as follows:
ΠCA ≥ min
{
2(ΠED −ΠF ),max{4ΠF ,ΠM + 2ΠF}
}
if ΠED > ΠF . (2)
The Appendix shows that (1)-(2) are also sufficient conditions and de-
fines the most preferred common agency equilibria for manufacturers. The
following proposition summarizes the main results in this section.
PROPOSITION 2. When the manufacturers are constrained by limited
liability, common agency equilibria exists if and only if (1)-(2) hold. More-
over, if the following conditions hold:
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2(ΠED −ΠF ) > ΠCA ≥ ΠM + 2ΠF > 4ΠF , (3)
then both manufacturers prefer the equilibria in which each of them earns
ΠCA − ΠM while the retailer earns 2ΠM − ΠCA. In other cases, whenever
such equilibria exist, both manufacturers prefer the ones in which they jointly
earn ΠCA while the retailer earns zero.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, condition (3) implies that exclusive dealing deviations are
most profitable and, in addition, they destroy common agency equilibria.
Hence, they constitute the main issue. The most effective way to deter such
deviations is to make it impossible for a deviating manufacturer to induce
an exclusive dealing configuration as a continuation equilibrium. That is, to
make it that, whenever one retailer is willing to accept an exclusive dealing
offer of one manufacturer, the other retailer always rejects a similar offer of
the other manufacturer (and thus represents either none or only one man-
ufacturer). Next, the condition 4ΠF < ΠM + 2ΠF (or 2ΠF < ΠM ) implies
that a single manufacturer prefers to distribute its product through one re-
tailer only. Naturally, in this case the retailer obtains some market power
and therefore it must earn some rent in equilibrium.
As the Appendix shows, in other cases manufacturers are capable to
extract all surplus of the common agent. This is not a priory obvious in the
setting where they have to make the offers which leave some rents to retailers
(e.g., in order to maximally deter foreclosure deviations it must be UEDhi <
ΠED for at least some i). The intuition is that manufacturers now exploit the
facts that offers are fully contingent and retailers make their decisions non-
cooperatively. Taken together, this allows manufacturers to induce retailers
to play a mis-coordination game that has as an equilibrium only the outcome
(i.e., the common agency configuration) where both retailers are worse off.
The analysis implies that foreclosure and exclusive dealing deviations
basically pose the main problem for the sustainability of an equilibrium.
Intuitively, the most effective way to deter them is to intensify bidding com-
petition for exclusive representation, i.e., to set all exclusive bids at the
lowest level. When manufacturers face limited liability, the lowest bid is
zero. Since ΠF and ΠED generally differ, this, however, is not sufficient to
fully deter foreclosure and exclusive dealing deviations. In contrast, if neg-
ative bids were allowed, all deviations could be deterred. For it suffices that
one manufacturer actually promise to pay each retailer (i.e., submit negative
bids) for exclusive distribution of its product so that the other manufacturer
will never find it profitable to outbid these offers. As the Appendix shows,
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in that case a common agency equilibrium can always be sustained. Fur-
thermore, in the best equilibrium manufacturers jointly earn ΠCA.
Taken together, these results lead to the following conclusions. First,
unlike the case of a single retailer, in the case of two retailers manufacturers
can fully extract all retailer’s surplus. In addition, when manufacturers are
allowed to submit negative bids, they can always induce common agency
representation. In contrast, limited liability, though it does not impede
manufacturers to fully extract retailer’s surplus, may yet cause a difficulty
in implementing common agency even if it is most efficient. This is due
to manufacturers’ inability to fully prevent all foreclosure deviations. As
it follows from (1), even if it generates the greatest total surplus (so that
in particular ΠCA > 2ΠF ), yet it will not arise in equilibrium when ΠF >
2ΠED and ΠCA < 2ΠF + 2
(
ΠF − 2ΠED
)
. This observation leads to the
second conclusion. When manufacturers are constrained by limited liability,
common agency will not necessarily arise even if it is most efficient. Thus,
unlike the case of a single retailer where a similar constraint appears to be
neutral and only contracting inefficiencies may prevent common agency to
arise, here, it may be the principal cause for an inefficient market outcome.
4.2 Double common agency equilibria
The analysis is similar to the one conducted for common agency equilibria
and therefore I briefly discuss this case while stressing the main points.
The following conditions ensure that (MA&MB,MA&MB) is an equilib-
rium of the subsequent retailer game:
ΠC − UCAi − U
C
Bi = max{0,Π
MX − UMXAi ,Π
MX − UMXBi },
for i = 1, 2. These condition implies that each retailer prefers to serve both
manufacturers if it anticipates that the other retailer will do the same.
A simple way to fully prevent all deviations to all configurations, in
which at least one retailer distributes the products of both manufacturers,
is to destroy common agency in all these configurations. That is, each man-
ufacturer h ∈ {A,B} must then set vMXhi = u
MX
hi = U
CA
hi = ∞ for i = 1, 2.
Thus, like in a common agency equilibrium, the only issue is to minimize
the gains from monopoly, foreclosure and exclusive dealing deviations. Con-
sequently, one can apply the results of lemma 1 to obtain the most effective
way to do it.
Note now that in a double common agency equilibrium only ‘mixed’
offers can constraint the manufacturers payoffs. However, since deviations
to the mixed configurations are no longer possible, manufacturers can set
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UMXAi = U
MX
Bi = ∞ for i = 1, 2 which allows them to capturer all the
surplus from the trade 2ΠC . Coupling this observation with the results of
lemma 1, one obtains the following condition for the existence of double
common agency equilibria:
2ΠC ≥ 2max
{
2
(
ΠF −ΠED
)
,min{2ΠF ,ΠED −ΠF }
}
. (4)
It is perhaps surprising that such a simple condition is only required for
the existence of a double common agency equilibrium, given that Rey and
Verge (2004) reach strikingly different conclusions. As they show, in any
such equilibrium retailers earn positive profits and it is technically difficult
to establish the conditions under which it always exists.
The key difference between my model and that of Rey and Verge is that
they consider non-contingent contracts.21 In this case and provided that
manufacturer’ products are substitutable, each retailer can earn higher profit
by distributing one product only. Consequently, manufacturers must leave
some rents to retailers to convince them to carry their products. Since in any
equilibrium manufacturers seek to minimize these rents, then under some
conditions it can be quite easy for a deviating manufacturer to sign up one or
two retailers into exclusive dealing arrangements. This leads to multiplicity
of deviations and, as a result of the richness of possible deviations, a double
common agency equilibrium does not always exist.
In contrast, when the contracts are fully contingent, manufacturers can
sharply reduce the scope for deviations. In particular, the fact that devia-
tions to the mixed configurations can now be ignored allows manufacturers
to insist on double common agency by withdrawing their ‘mixed’ offers (i.e.,
by setting UMXAi = U
MX
Bi =∞ for i = 1, 2). In that case they leave each re-
tailer with no alternatives but to accept serving non or both manufacturers
and, as a consequence, share no rent with them in equilibrium. Further-
more, considering only foreclosure and exclusive dealing deviations gives
rise to a simple condition governing the existence of double common agency
equilibria.
To complete the analysis, it remains to find the menus that ensure that
(MA&MB,MA&MB) is the unique continuation equilibrium and all foreclo-
sure and exclusive dealing deviations are maximally deterred. This can be
done by employing basically the same mechanism as in the case of common
agency, i.e., by inducing retailers to play the mis-coordination game which
21There is also difference in the set of feasible contracts. Rey and Verge focus on two-
part tariffs while here only lump-sum payments are considered.
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has instead (MA&MB,MA&MB) as the unique equilibrium.
22 To recap, I
can state the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3. When manufacturers are constrained by limited li-
ability, double common agency equilibria exist if and only if (4) holds. In
that case they prefer the equilibria in which they jointly earn total surplus
2ΠC while each retailer earns zero.
As before, under some conditions, namely, 2ΠF < 2ΠC < 2ΠF+2
(
ΠF − 2ΠED
)
,
double common agency will not necessarily arise even if it is most efficient.
Likewise, it is easy to verify that if negative bids were allowed, all devia-
tions could be totally deterred and, consequently, a double common agency
equilibrium could always be sustained.
4.3 Equilibria in mixed configurations
This section studies the situation where manufacturer A is served by both
retailers while manufacturer B is served by retailer 1 only, which corresponds
to the (MA&MB,MA) configuration. Note, in particular, that retailer 1,
who is supposed to act as a common agent, will choose to represent both
manufacturers, only if the following condition holds:
ΠMXAB − u
MX
A1 − v
MX
B1 = max{0,Π
ED − UEDB1 ,Π
F − UFA1}. (5)
Though the formal analysis is slightly different, the main insights remain
the same. That is, only foreclosure and exclusive dealing deviations pose the
main problem for the sustainability of an equilibrium. The main difference
is that now the choice of UEDB1 and U
F
A1 affects the manufacturers’ payoffs
in equilibrium, as it follows from (5). Thus, for the exception of UEDB1 and
UFA1, the other offers must be chosen to maximally deter foreclosure and
exclusive dealing deviations, while UEDB1 and U
F
A1 must resolve the trade-off
between the rent extraction and the deterrence of deviations. The following
proposition states the main results in this section.
PROPOSITION 4. When manufacturers are constrained by limited li-
ability, equilibria in mixed configurations exist if and only if the following
conditions hold. If ΠED < ΠF then it must be
ΠMXAB ≥ max{Π
ED, 2(ΠF −ΠED)}, (6)
and
22See the Appendix for the proof.
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ΠMXAB +Π
MX ≥ 4ΠF − 3ΠED, (7)
while if ΠED > ΠF then it must be
ΠMXAB ≥ min{2Π
F ,ΠED −ΠF}, (8)
and
ΠMX +ΠMXAB ≥ 2min{2Π
F ,ΠED −ΠF }. (9)
Moreover, when ΠED > 2(ΠF − ΠED) > 0 and (6)-(7) hold then both
manufacturers prefer the equilibria in which they jointly earn ΠMXAB −[Π
ED−
2(ΠF−ΠED)] in outlet 1 while manufacturer A earns ΠMX in outlet 2. Cor-
respondingly, retailer 1 then earns ΠED−2(ΠF −ΠED) and retailer 2 earns
zero. In other cases, whenever such equilibria exist, both manufacturers pre-
fer the ones in which they jointly earn ΠMXAB +Π
MX while each retailer earns
zero.
Proof. Available upon request.
Conditions (6) and (8) in proposition 4 deserve some explanation. In-
tuitively, manufacturer B can always obtain some payoff by undertaking
either foreclosure or exclusive dealing deviations. Hence, in order to sus-
tain an equilibrium, it must be given at least this payoff. This observation,
taken together with the facts that manufacturer A is constrained by limited
liability and both manufacturers cannot earn more than ΠMXAB in outlet 1,
gives rise to conditions (6) and (8). Conditions (7) and (9) in turn imply
that the maximal joint payoff of manufacturers must exceed the sum of their
individual payoffs obtained by deviating.
As before, manufacturers induce retailers to play the game that has
as an equilibrium only the outcome (i.e., the mixed configuration) where
both retailers are worse off. By doing so, in all cases but one they are
capable to extract all the surplus from the trade. The fact that, when
0 < 2(ΠF −ΠED) < ΠED, they have to leave some rent to retailer 1 can be
understood as follows.
When manufacturers are constrained by limited liability and ΠF > ΠED,
foreclosure deviations are always possible. As DEVFB1 and DEV
F
B2 imply,
the minimal payoff that manufacturer B obtains from such deviations is
2(ΠF − ΠED), i.e., when manufacturer A sets UEDA1 = U
ED
A2 = 0. On the
other hand, condition (5), in particular, implies that, in order to extract all
surplus from retailer 1 in equilibrium, manufacturer A must set UFA1 = ∞.
However, in that case manufacturer B can also undertake exclusive dealing
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deviations, namely, to (MB,MA) and earn Π
ED, as it follows fromDEVEDB1 .
Clearly, when 2(ΠF −ΠED) < ΠED such deviations are more profitable than
foreclosure ones. Thus, in order to reduce the gain from exclusive dealing
deviations of manufacturer B and, consequently, enhance the sustainability
of an equilibrium, manufacturers must attribute some rent to retailer 1.
It is easy to see that when manufacturers are constrained by limited
liability, a mixed configuration will not necessarily arise even if it is most
efficient. As (7) implies this would be the case if 2ΠF < ΠMXAB + Π
MX <
2ΠF + (2ΠF − 3ΠED).
Finally, the Appendix also demonstrates that if negative bids were al-
lowed, all deviations could be totally deterred. Consequently, in that case
manufacturers could always sustain an equilibrium in mixed configurations.
4.4 Exclusive dealing equilibria
In contrast to the above considered configurations, exclusive dealing will al-
ways arise whenever it generates the greatest total surplus. Intuitively, in
constructing such an equilibrium, one can restrict attention on the offers
aimed to obtain exclusive relationship with each retailer. In that case such
an equilibrium can be sustained only if ΠED > ΠF because otherwise at least
one manufacturer could profitably deviate to foreclosure. As before, manu-
facturers induce retailers to play the game that has as an equilibrium only
the outcome (i.e., the exclusive dealing configuration) where both retailers
obtain zero. The following proposition formalizes the result.
PROPOSITION 5. When manufacturers are constrained by limited li-
ability, exclusive dealing equilibria exist if and only if ΠED > ΠF . In that
case they prefer the equilibria in which each of them earns ΠED while each
retailer earns zero.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The Appendix also shows that if manufacturers were allowed to submit
negative bids they could deter all foreclosure deviations and, consequently,
sustain an exclusive dealing equilibrium even if ΠF ≥ ΠED.
4.5 Foreclosure equilibria
In this case manufacturers compete head-to-head to sign up both retailers
into exclusive relationship. Note also that, since in any foreclosure equilib-
rium a rival manufacturer always contemplates the possibility to mitigate
competition and instead deal with one retailer only, it is natural to expect
that such an equilibrium can exist only if ΠF > ΠED.
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PROPOSITION 6. Foreclosure equilibria exist if and only if ΠF >
ΠED. When manufacturers are constrained by limited liability, in the most
preferred equilibrium manufacturer h announces the following menu ΣFh :
• UCAhi = U
C
hi = u
MX
hi = v
MX
hi = U
MX
hi =∞ for i = 1, 2.
• UMhi = U
ED
hi = 0 and U
F
hi = Π
F −ΠED −  for i = 1, 2 where  > 0.
The corresponding retailer game g(ΣFA,Σ
F
B) gives rise to two equilibria,
(MA,MA) and (MB,MB). In case both retailers choose to represent man-
ufacturer h, the latter earns 2(ΠF − ΠED − ) while each retailer earns
ΠED + .
Proof. See the Appendix.
As the proposition states, when manufacturers compete for foreclosure,
they can still earn positive profits. This is due to the fact that retailers do
not cooperate in their choice of a manufacturer. To better understand this
result, note that in order to destroy the foreclosure equilibrium of its rival,
a manufacturer must make an exclusive dealing offer which yields at least
ΠF to a retailer. However, when this manufacturer is constrained by limited
liability, it cannot offer more than ΠED < ΠF . Furthermore, when retailers
decide non-cooperatively which manufacturer to represent, it cannot induce
them to select the desired foreclosure equilibrium, even if it offers more
attractive foreclosure payments. Hence, no manufacturer h has incentives
to deviate from the proposed menu ΣFh .
If instead manufacturers were allowed to submit negative bids then the
above strategies ΣFA and Σ
F
B would no longer constitute an equilibrium. This
is because manufacturer h could then deviate and ensure that (Mh,Mh) is
the unique equilibrium of the retailer game by offering U˜EDhi < 0 and U˜
M
hi < 0
for i = 1, 2. In which case it could earn 2(ΠF−ΠED−) with probability one.
Clearly, such deviations will never be profitable only if each manufacturer h
earns zero in (Mh,Mh). Correspondingly, in equilibrium each manufacturer
h offers UFhi = 0, U
ED
hi = −(Π
F − ΠED − ) for i = 1, 2 and thus leaves all
rents to retailers.
I complete the analysis by noticing that neither monopoly configuration
can ever be an equilibrium ofG. This is because an inactive manufacturer can
always profitably deviate by offering an inactive retailer the payoff which is
slightly higher than zero. This observation, taken together with the previous
results, leads to the following conclusions. First, monopoly will never arise in
equilibrium even if it is most efficient. Second, when bids are unconstrained,
any configuration but monopoly and foreclosure can always be sustained in
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equilibrium. Moreover, whenever such a configuration is most efficient it
is the best equilibrium for manufacturers. As for foreclosure, it can be an
equilibrium when it is most efficient but it is always a Pareto-dominated
equilibrium for manufacturers. Finally, when bids are constrained to be
non-negative, any configuration, in which at least one retailer acts as a
common agent, will not necessarily arise in equilibrium even if it is most
efficient. In contrast, foreclosure can be the unique equilibrium even if some
other configuration generates greater total surplus.
5 Less contingent offers
The preceding analysis focused on the sustainability of different equilibria
and the maximal profits that manufacturers could achieve, given that they
make fully contingent offers. In practice, however, it may be difficult or even
prohibited for manufacturers to write a contract contingent on all conceiv-
able situations. Thus, it is natural to ask how the preceding results would
differ if the offers were less contingent.
One way to reduce the degree of contingency is to consider an environ-
ment where the contract between one manufacturer and one retailer does
not depend on the contract signed by the other manufacturer and the other
retailer. One reason for such a restraint is that a manufacturer may not
know the nature of the relationship in the other manufacturer-retailer pair
because, say, it is not directly involved in it. Another reason is that such
contracts may be found anticompetitive and consequently terminated by
competition authorities.
In order to isolate the effects stemming purely from the reduced degree
of contingency, I adapt the competitive game G in which manufacturers’
bids can be negative but impose the following constraints: UMhi = U
ED
hi
and UCAhi = v
MX
hi for h ∈ {A,B} and i = 1, 2. The constraint U
M
hi = U
ED
hi
implies that, while trying to sign up retailer i into exclusive relationship,
manufacturer h does not observe whether manufacturer k is doing the same
with retailer j. The constraint UCAhi = v
MX
hi implies that, while establishing
common agency with retailer i,manufacturer h does not know whether man-
ufacturer k is offering any contract to retailer j. The following proposition
states the results of the analysis in this case.
PROPOSITION 7. Suppose that manufacturers’ bids can be negative
but UMhi = U
ED
hi and U
CA
hi = v
MX
hi for i = 1, 2 and h ∈ {A,B}. Then,
double common agency, exclusive dealing equilibria and equilibria in mixed
configurations always exist. Common agency equilibria exist if and only if
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ΠCA ≥ min{ΠMXAB +Π
MX ,max{0,ΠMXAB +Π
MX −ΠED +ΠM}}.
Foreclosure equilibria exist if and only if ΠF > ΠED and monopoly can
never be an equilibrium. Moreover, in the most preferred double common
agency, common agency, exclusive dealing and mixed configuration equilibria
manufacturers earn all the surplus from the trade while in all foreclosure
equilibria they earn zero.
Proof. Available upon request.
Thus, the only difference from the case when bids are fully contingent is
that now common agency cannot be always implemented as an equilibrium.
Intuitively, the constraints UCAhi = v
MX
hi for i = 1, 2 do not allow manufac-
turer h to fully respond to some deviations of its rival. Namely, when it
deviates by employing the second retailer (who is inactive) and thus induces
a mixed configuration. As a result, in some circumstances it become more
difficult to sustain common agency equilibria.
Using the results of proposition 7, it is easy to check that the most
efficient configuration (except the monopoly one) can still be sustained in
equilibrium. This, however, might not be true if the degree of contingency
were further reduced. Moreover, in this case one might have the situation
where even the most efficient configuration cannot be implemented as the
unique continuation equilibrium. This is because when offers are less contin-
gent manufacturers have less instruments to affect retailers’ decisions. As a
result, they might not be able to get rid of multiple continuation equilibria.
To gain some intuition for this, I consider the extreme case when the
offers are completely non-contingent, i.e., when each manufacturer h offers
Uhi to retailer i in any distribution configuration. In the Appendix, I give
the examples of the parameter values under which (i) the most efficient
configuration cannot be an equilibrium, and (ii) it cannot be implemented
as the unique continuation equilibrium.
6 Bilateral bargaining power
Although I have assumed that manufacturers have all the bargaining power
and make take-it-or-leave offers to retailers, the analysis would remain sim-
ilar if instead retailers had all the bargaining power and made offers to
manufacturers.23 Building on this observation, the purpose of this section is
23There is a greate amount of evidence showing that retailers no longer behaive passively
but instead exert some bargaining power. For example, there is a believe among industry
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to study the issue of how allocation of the bargaining power affects the pos-
sibility to implement the most efficient configuration in equilibrium. Given
the multiplicity of equilibria, I restrict attention on the best equilibrium
from the viewpoint of the players who act as first-movers.
When bids are unconstrained, the analysis suggests that if either dou-
ble common agency, exclusive dealing or mixed distribution generates the
greatest total surplus then it plays no role of who initiates the offers. In
either case the most efficient configuration is the most preferred equilibrium
for both sides. In contrast, if either foreclosure or common agency generates
the greatest total surplus, then manufacturers and retailers differ in their
choice of the most preferred equilibria. In the first case, full efficiency can be
achieved only if retailers have all the bargaining power while in the second
case - only if manufacturers have the same.
When bids are constrained to be non-negative, the situation is more
complicated because one needs to take into account the necessary conditions
for every distribution configuration to be an equilibrium. Consequently,
three situations are possible. That is, (i) the market outcome is efficient
regardless of who has the bargaining power, (ii) efficiency can be achieved
only if manufacturers (or retailers) have all the bargaining power, and (iii)
efficiency can never be achieved.
To illustrate these points, suppose that double common agency is most
efficient, i.e., 2ΠC > 2ΠF ,ΠCA, and, in addition, 2ΠF ,ΠCA > 4ΠED. It
can be shown that, when retailers make take-or-leave-it offers, double com-
mon agency equilibria exist only if 2ΠC ≥ 2(ΠCA − 2ΠED) and in their
most preferred equilibria retailers jointly earn 2ΠC . From this the following
conclusions can be drawn: (i) “who has the bargaining power” is unim-
portant for the efficient outcome to arise only if ΠC ≥ 2(ΠF − ΠED) and
ΠC ≥ ΠCA − 2ΠED, (ii) if 2(ΠF − ΠED) < ΠC < ΠCA − 2ΠED then the
market outcome will be efficient only if manufacturers have all the bargain-
ing power,24 and (iii) if ΠC < 2(ΠF − ΠED) and ΠC < ΠCA − 2ΠED then
efficiency can never be achieved.
observers that increasing concentration, introduction of private labels and limited shelf
space have contributed to the perceived shift in the balance of power from manufacturers
to retailers. Some implications of retail bargaining power have been recently explored in
Marx and Shaffer (2006) and Rey et al. (2006).
24Likewise, if ΠCA − 2ΠED < ΠC < 2(ΠF − ΠED) it will be efficient only if retailers
have all the barganing power.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, I have developed a framework where two rival manufacturers
seek to establish trading relationships with two available retailers who in
turn decide non-cooperatively which manufacturer’s offer, if any, to accept.
Although there are many important issues to explore in this setting, the
main focus of the present analysis is on the possibility for the most efficient
configuration to be sustained in equilibrium.
The main findings are as follows. In the absence of any constraints on the
manufacturers’ offers, the most efficient configuration (except monopoly one)
can always be implemented as an equilibrium. Moreover, for the exception
of foreclosure it is a Pareto-undominated equilibrium for manufacturers. In
contrast, when the offers are subject to various constraints, the efficiency
may no longer be achieved. For example, when the offers are constrained to
be non-negative or when they are totally non-contingent, the most efficient
configuration is not always an equilibrium. In addition, in the first case
foreclosure can be the unique equilibrium even if it is inefficient while in
the second one it is possible that the most efficient configuration cannot be
sustained as the unique continuation equilibrium.
The extant literature on modeling bilaterally oligopolistic industries with
retailers being capable to exert some market power vis-à-vis manufacturers is
still scarce. Early papers such as Dobson and Waterson (2001) and Moner et
al. (2005) obtain equilibria under quite restrictive conditions. In Dobson and
Waterson, it is the assumption that under exclusive dealing a manufacturer-
retailer pair behaves as a vertically integrated unit while in Moner et al.,
it is the restriction to inefficient contracts, i.e., linear wholesale prices. In
attempt to extend the analysis by including two-part tariffs into the set of
wholesale contracts, Rey and Verge (2004), however, find it considerably
complicated and only show that some distribution configurations may never
arise in equilibrium. The present paper thus contributes to this literature
in that it establishes the conditions under which every possible distribution
configuration can be sustained in equilibrium and characterizes the most
preferred one (for the players who make contract offers). In this respect,
it can serve as a building block for a more complex analysis, for example,
concerned with vertical arrangements.
However, my model has two notable limitations. First, I have assumed
that, after manufacturers have announced their offers, retailers make their
decisions simultaneously which effectively implies that all trading links are
established at the same time. This reflects reality in many, although not
all, settings. For example, some trading links can be established before
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the others. Moreover, it is also reasonable to expect that the division and
the size of the joint surplus is determined by bilateral negotiations. The
extension of my analysis to such circumstances is an important avenue for
future research. Recent papers that make a start in this direction include de
Fontenay and Gans (2005) (who study a dynamic game in which bilateral
negotiations take place in a pre-specified order and the parties involved in
negotiations bargain over an action affecting their joint surplus and a trans-
fer between them) and Bedre (2006) (who applies the approach of sequential
bargaining to a simpler setting with two retailers and one manufacturer but
considers more complex contracts such as two- and three-part tariffs). Sec-
ond, and perhaps more important, I have assumed that the joint surplus
earned in a given outlet is exogenous. This admittedly ad hoc (and perhaps
less satisfactory) structure has been adopted to avoid technical difficulties
arising when manufacturers offer potentially complex contracts. For exam-
ple, when they offer (contingent) two-part tariffs then the main difficulty
stems from the fact that even if a retailer has accepted to contract with a
manufacturer it may find it more profitable to buy zero quantity of its prod-
uct afterwards. As a result, determination of equilibrium contracts (as well
as the joint surplus) becomes somewhat complicated. On the other hand,
opening this “black box” is undoubtedly an important issue since it would
allow us to evaluate prices and welfare effects and thus fully characterize
equilibria in each case. This is again the subject for future research.
Appendix
A The proof of lemma 1
For the sake of concreteness, suppose that manufacturer A deviates.
Consider the ability of manufacturer B to deter its deviations by choosing
UEDBi , U
F
Bi and U
M
hi for i = 1, 2 while keeping all other payments unchanged.
Case1. ΠF > ΠED.
As it follows from DEVFAi, in this case foreclosure deviations are always
possible and, in order to minimize the gain from such deviations, man-
ufacturer B must set UEDB1 = U
ED
B2 = 0. Note also that the conditions
UEDB1 = U
ED
B2 = 0 eliminates any possibility for monopoly deviations and
therefore UMB1, U
M
B2 can be chosen in an arbitrary way. As for exclusive
dealing deviations, the DEVEDAi condition implies that manufacturer B can
fully deter them by setting UFBi < Π
F −ΠED for i = 1, 2.
Case 2. ΠF < ΠED.
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In this case manufacturer A can equally deviate to exclusive dealing,
monopoly and foreclosure depending on whether UEDB1 , U
ED
B2 are lower or
higher than ΠED. Therefore, in order to find the most effective way to deter
these deviations, four types of strategies need to be distinguished.
Suppose, first, that manufacturer B sets UEDB1 , U
ED
B2 < Π
ED. By doing
so, it eliminates the possibility for manufacturer A to undertake monopoly
deviations and therefore UMB1, U
M
B2 can take on any values. In contrast,
manufacturer A can then undertake exclusive dealing deviations. As it fol-
lows from DEVEDAi , the gain from such deviations will be minimal only
if UFB1 = U
F
B2 = 0. Finally, taking into account limited liability and the
DEVFA1, DEV
F
A2 constraints, manufacturer B can deter all manufacturer
A’s foreclosure deviations by setting UEDBi < Π
ED − ΠF for at least some
i.25
Suppose now that UEDB1 > Π
ED and UEDB2 < Π
ED which implies that
manufacturerA can undertake some monopoly deviations, namely, to (MA, ∅).
In order to fully deter such deviations, manufacturer B must set UMB1 = 0.
Likewise, manufacturer A can undertake some exclusive dealing deviations,
namely, to (MB,MA). In that case, in order to minimize the gain from such
deviations, manufacturer B must set UFB2 = 0. As for manufacturer A’s fore-
closure deviations, they will be impossible if, in addition, UEDB2 < Π
ED−ΠF .
To recap, the strategy comprising UEDB1 > Π
ED and UEDB2 < Π
ED does not
lower the gain from exclusive dealing deviations but instead gives rise to the
possibility for monopoly deviations. Note that the same reasoning applies
to the case when UEDB1 < Π
ED and UEDB2 > Π
ED.
Suppose, finally, that UEDB1 , U
ED
B2 > Π
ED. In that case, manufacturer B
rules out the possibility for exclusive dealing deviations and therefore can
set UFB1 and U
F
B2 in an arbitrary way. Next, as it follows from DEV
F
Ai,
by undertaking foreclosure deviations, manufacturer A can earn all the sur-
plus from the trade 2ΠF . Note that monopoly deviations are also possible.
However, given that manufacturer A can always earn 2ΠF , the best what
manufacturer B can do in this case is to choose UMB1 and U
M
B2 in a way that
manufacturer A could not earn more than 2ΠF from monopoly deviations,
i.e., to set UMBi ≤ max{Π
M − 2ΠF , 0} for i = 1, 2.
To recap, when 2ΠF > ΠED − ΠF then manufacturer A can earn at
most ΠED − ΠF by deviating. This can be done, for example, as follows:
manufacturer B sets UFBi = 0, U
M
Bi ≥ 0, U
ED
Bi < Π
ED for i = 1, 2 and UEDBi <
ΠED − ΠF for at least some i. When 2ΠF ≤ ΠED − ΠF the most effective
25Because of limited liability manufacturer A cannot offer a negative U˜FAi and thus
cannot deviate to foreclosure even if U˜FA1 + U˜
F
A2 > 0.
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way to deter manufacturer A’s deviations is to set UFBi ≥ 0, U
ED
Bi > Π
ED
and UMBi ≤ max{Π
M − 2ΠF , 0} for i = 1, 2. Since a similar analysis applies
to manufacturer B’s deviations, lemma 1 is established. 
B The proof of proposition 2
Since it has been shown in the text that (1)-(2) are necessary conditions,
it remains only to show that they are also sufficient. For this, four cases
need to be distinguished.
Case 1. ΠED ≤ ΠF .
In this case common agency equilibria exist if ΠCA ≥ 4
(
ΠF −ΠED
)
.
Consequently, in order to prove the ‘only if’ part of the proposition, I con-
struct the menus ΣCAA and Σ
CA
B such that (i) the corresponding retailer game
g(ΣCAA ,Σ
CA
B ) has only (MA&MB, ∅) as a pure-strategy equilibrium in which
manufacturers jointly earn ΠCA and (ii) by deviating, each manufacturer
can earn at most 2
(
ΠF −ΠED
)
. This can be done as follows. Suppose that
each manufacturer h announces the menu ΣCAh :
• UCAh1 =
1
2
ΠCA while UMh2 = 0 and U
M
h1 = U
CA
h2 = U
MX
hi = U
C
hi = v
MX
hi =
uMXhi =∞ for i = 1, 2.
• If ΠF > ΠED then UFh1 = min{Π
F , 3(ΠF − ΠED)}, UFh2 = 0 and
UEDhi = 0 for i = 1, 2. If Π
F = ΠED then UFh1 = U
ED
h2 = λ
′ΠF and
UEDh1 = U
F
h2 = 0 where 0 < λ
′ < min{1, Π
CA
2ΠF
}.
The choice of foreclosure and exclusive dealing offers deserves some expla-
nation. By making such offers, manufacturers induce the mechanism under
which one retailer tries to ‘catch’ the other. In essence, it implies the follow-
ing: if retailer 1 chooses to represent manufacturer h then so does retailer 2,
however, in this case retailer 1 will instead prefer to represent manufacturer
k. As a result, neither exclusive dealing nor foreclosure configurations can
be equilibria in the game g(ΣCAA ,Σ
CA
B ).
Thus, by construction, (MA&MB, ∅) is the unique continuation equilib-
rium in which each manufacturer earns 1
2
ΠCA. It remains to verify that no
manufacturer can gain by deviating.
To begin, no manufacturer k can gain by deviating to the mixed and
double common agency configurations because its rival sets vMXhi = U
MX
hi =
UChi =∞ for i = 1, 2 and can undertake monopoly deviations because U
ED
hi <
ΠED for i = 1, 2.
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Consider now manufacturer k’s foreclosure deviations. By plugging UEDh1 =
UEDh2 = 0 into DEV
F
k1 and DEV
F
k2, one finds that in the most profitable
foreclosure deviation manufacturer k earns 2(ΠF −ΠED) ≤ 1
2
ΠCA.
Consider, finally, manufacturer k’s exclusive dealing deviations to (Mh,Mk)
and (Mk,Mh). Note that both type of deviations are equally possible because
UEDh1 = U
ED
h2 = 0. Since U
F
h2 = 0 then, as it follows fromDEV
ED
k2 , deviations
to (Mh,Mk) are never profitable because in that case manufacturer k has
to offer a negative U˜EDk2 ≤ −(Π
F −ΠED) < 0. Next, manufacturer k cannot
gain from deviations to (Mk,Mh) either. Indeed, by plugging the condition
UFh1 = min{Π
F , 3(ΠF − ΠED)} into DEVEDk1 , one obtains that in any such
deviation it can earn
U˜EDk1 ≤ U
F
h1−(Π
F−ΠED) = min{ΠED, 2(ΠF−ΠED)} ≤ 2(ΠF−ΠED) ≤
1
2
ΠCA.
Let us turn to the case when ΠF = ΠED. In this case each manufacturer
k can undertake both foreclosure and exclusive dealing deviations. Since
UEDh1 = 0 and U
ED
h2 = λ
′ΠF , the most profitable foreclosure deviation yields
λ′ΠF . Since UFh1 = λ
′ΠF and UFh2 = 0, the most profitable exclusive dealing
deviation also yields λ′ΠF . The condition λ′ < min{1, Π
CA
2ΠF
} implies λ′ΠF <
1
2
ΠCA and therefore neither of these deviations is profitable. Note that in
this case all deviations can be deterred and consequently a common agency
equilibrium can always be sustained.
Case 2. 0 < 2(ΠED −ΠF ) ≤ max{4ΠF ,ΠM + 2ΠF}.
In this case common agency equilibria exist if ΠCA ≥ 2(ΠED−ΠF ). The
proof is similar to the one conducted in the previous case. The only difference
is that now the menus ΣCAA and Σ
CA
B must be such that, by deviating, each
manufacturer can earn at most ΠED − ΠF . This can be done as follows.
Suppose that each manufacturer h announces the menu ΣCAh :
• UCAh1 =
1
2
ΠCA while UMh2 = 0 and U
M
h1 = U
CA
h2 = U
MX
hi = U
C
hi = v
MX
hi =
uMXhi =∞ for i = 1, 2.
• UEDh1 = 0, U
ED
h2 = Π
ED−λΠF where λ ∈ (0, 1) and UFhi = 0 for i = 1, 2.
It is easy to check that (MA&MB, ∅) is the unique continuation equi-
librium in which each manufacturer earns 1
2
ΠCA. It remains to verify that
no manufacturer can gain by deviating. As before, only foreclosure and
exclusive dealing deviations need to be considered.
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In this case no manufacturer k can undertake foreclosure deviations be-
cause of its rival’s exclusive dealing offer UEDh1 = 0 and the limited liabil-
ity constraint: as DEVFk1 implies, in order to induce retailer 1 to carry
its product, manufacturer k must then offer a negative payment U˜Fk1 ≤
−(ΠED −ΠF ).
In contrast, since UEDh1 , U
ED
h2 < Π
ED then each manufacturer k can al-
ways undertake exclusive dealing deviations. By plugging UFk1 = U
F
k2 = 0
into DEVEDhi , one obtains that in any such deviation manufacturer k earns
U˜EDki ≤ (Π
ED −ΠF ) ≤
1
2
ΠCA.
Thus, no manufacturer can gain by deviating.
Case 3. ΠM + 2ΠF ≤ 4ΠF < 2(ΠED −ΠF ).
In this case common agency equilibria exist if ΠCA ≥ 4ΠF and one needs
to ensure that only foreclosure deviations are possible. Suppose that each
manufacturer h offers the following menu ΣCAh : U
CA
h1 =
1
2
ΠCA and
UCAh2 = U
M
hi = U
F
hi = U
ED
hi = U
MX
hi = U
C
hi = v
MX
hi = u
MX
hi =∞
for i = 1, 2.
It is easy to check that (MA&MB, ∅) is the unique equilibrium in which
each manufacturer earns 1
2
ΠCA. It is straightforward to check that there are
no profitable deviations either.
Indeed, the conditions UEDk1 = U
ED
k2 = ∞ imply that exclusive dealing
deviations are impossible while in the best foreclosure deviation manufac-
turer h earns 2ΠF ≤ 1
2
ΠCA. Finally, the condition 2ΠF ≥ ΠM implies that a
manufacturer always prefers the best foreclosure deviation to any monopoly
one.
Case 4. 4ΠF < ΠM + 2ΠF < 2(ΠED −ΠF ).
In this case common agency equilibria exist if ΠCA ≥ ΠM + 2ΠF . Thus,
the main issue is to ensure that only foreclosure and monopoly deviations
be possible. Consider the following menu ΣCAh announced by manufacturer
h:
• UCAh1 = U
M
hi = Π
CA −ΠM for i = 1, 2.
• UCAh2 = U
F
h2 = U
ED
hi = U
MX
hi = U
C
hi = v
MX
hi = u
MX
hi = ∞ for i = 1, 2
while UFh1 = 0.
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The condition UFh1 = 0 is added in order to destroy the possibility for
(∅,MA) and (∅,MB) to be equilibria in the game g(Σ
CA
A ,Σ
CA
B ). Furthermore,
it is easy to check that (MA&MB, ∅) is the unique equilibrium in which each
manufacturer earns ΠCA −ΠM .
As before, because of UEDk1 = U
ED
k2 =∞ no exclusive dealing deviation is
possible while in the best foreclosure deviation manufacturer h earns 2ΠF .
The condition UMki = Π
CA−ΠM implies that in the best monopoly deviation
manufacturer h earns ΠCA −ΠM ≥ 2ΠF . This proves the proposition.
Remark. I now show that if negative bids were allowed, a common
agency equilibrium could always be sustained. To see this, suppose that
each manufacturer h announces the following menu ΣCAh :
• UCAh1 = Π
CA − UCAk1 ≥ 0 while U
M
h2 = 0 and U
M
h1 = U
CA
h2 = U
MX
hi =
UChi = v
MX
hi = u
MX
hi =∞ for i = 1, 2.
• If ΠED > ΠF then UEDh1 = −U
ED
h2 = λΠ
ED where λ ∈ (0, 1) and
UFhi = −(Π
ED−ΠF ) for i = 1, 2. If ΠF > ΠED then UFh1 = Π
F −ΠED,
UFh2 < 0 and U
ED
hi = −(Π
F −ΠED) for i = 1, 2.
When ΠED > ΠF manufacturers offer negative foreclosure payments,
ΠF −ΠED, in order to fully deter exclusive dealing deviations, while when
ΠF > ΠED they offer negative exclusive dealing payments, ΠED − ΠF , in
order to fully deter foreclosure deviations. The conditions UEDh1 = −U
ED
h2 =
λΠED where λ ∈ (0, 1) and UFh1 = Π
F − ΠED, UFh2 < 0 ensure that neither
exclusive dealing nor foreclosure configurations can arise as continuation
equilibria in the game g(ΣCAA ,Σ
CA
B ). Finally, the conditions U
M
A2 = U
M
B2 = 0
ensure that the (∅, ∅) representation cannot be an equilibrium.
Thus, by construction, (MA&MB, ∅) is the unique (pure-strategy) con-
tinuation equilibrium in which manufacturers jointly earn ΠCA. It can be
also verified that no manufacturer can gain by deviating. Consequently, the
above menus ΣCAA and Σ
CA
B indeed constitute an equilibrium.
C The proof of proposition 3
Since it has been discussed in the text that (3) is a necessary condition,
it remains only to show that it is also sufficient. For this, two cases need to
be distinguished.
Case 1. ΠED ≤ 3ΠF .
In this case condition (4) boils down to
ΠC ≥ max
{(
ΠED −ΠF
)
, 2
(
ΠF −ΠED
)}
. C1
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In what follows, I construct the menus ΣCAA and Σ
CA
B such that (i)
g(ΣCAA ,Σ
CA
B ) has only (MA&MB,MA&MB) as a pure-strategy equilibrium
in which each manufacturer earns ΠC and (ii) by deviating, each manufac-
turer can earn at most max
{(
ΠED −ΠF
)
, 2
(
ΠF −ΠED
)}
. To show this,
suppose that manufacturer h offers the following menu ΣCh :
• UChi =
1
2
ΠC and UMXhi = ∞ for i = 1, 2 so that (MA&MB,MA&MB)
is indeed an equilibrium.
• vMXhi = U
CA
hi = u
MX
hi = ∞ for i = 1, 2 so that deviations to common
agency and mixed configurations are never profitable.
• UMhi = 0 for i = 1, 2 so that the (∅, ∅) representation cannot be an
equilibrium.
• If ΠED > ΠF then UEDh1 = 0, U
ED
h2 = Π
ED−λΠF where λ ∈ (0, 1) and
UFhi = 0 for i = 1, 2. If Π
F > ΠED then UFh1 = min{Π
F , 3(ΠF−ΠED)},
UFh2 = 0 and U
ED
hi = 0 for i = 1, 2. If Π
F = ΠED then UFh1 = U
ED
h2 =
λΠF and UEDh1 = U
F
h2 = 0 where 0 < λ < min{1,
Π
CA
2ΠF
}.
It is easy to check that (MA&MB,MA&MB) is the unique equilibrium of
g(ΣCA,Σ
C
B) in which each manufacturer earns Π
C . Note also that foreclosure
and exclusive dealing offers are identical to those used to construct common
agency equilibria. Hence, by applying the same reasoning as before, it can
be verified that only foreclosure and exclusive dealing deviations are possible
but neither of them is profitable if C1 holds.
Case 2. ΠED > 3ΠF .
In this case condition (4) boils down to ΠC ≥ 2ΠF and the corresponding
equilibrium strategies can be chosen as follows. ΣCh consists of
• UChi =
1
2
ΠC and UMXhi = ∞ for i = 1, 2 so that (MA&MB,MA&MB)
is indeed an equilibrium.
• vMXhi = U
CA
hi = u
MX
hi = U
ED
hi =∞ for i = 1, 2.
• For h = A: UFA2 = ∞, U
M
A1 = λΠ
M and UMA2 = U
F
A1 = 0. For h =
B: UFB1 = ∞, U
M
B2 = λΠ
M and UMB1 = U
F
B2 = 0 where 0 < λ ≤
min{1, 2Π
F
ΠM
}.
The choice of monopoly and foreclosure offers deserves some explanation.
By making such offers, manufacturers induce the mechanism under which
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one retailer tries to ‘catch’ the other. To illustrate this, suppose that retailer
2 chooses to represent manufacturer A. Since UMA2 = 0 this would be prof-
itable for retailer 2 only if retailer 1 were inactive. However, since UFA1 = 0
retailer 1 instead prefers to serve manufacturer A as well. In this case,
because of UFA2 = ∞ retailer 2 chooses to represent neither manufacturer.
However, when retailer 2 is inactive retailer 1 switches on manufacturer B
because UMB1 = 0. After that retailers do the same with manufacturer B
until retailer 2 switches on manufacturer A and the cycle restarts.
The choice of λ is motivated by the following. λ should be positive
because otherwise it would be impossible to implement (MA&MB,MA&MB)
as the unique continuation equilibrium. Indeed, if λ = 0 then, for example,
(∅,MA) would be also a continuation equilibrium. On the other hand, λ
should not be too large because otherwise manufacturers could earn more
than 2ΠF by undertaking monopoly deviations.
By construction, (MA&MB,MA&MB) is the unique equilibrium of g(Σ
C
A,Σ
C
B)
in which each manufacturer earns ΠC . It remains to verify that no manufac-
turer can earn more than 2ΠF by deviating. Since each manufacturer h sets
UEDhi = ∞ for i = 1, 2 then this is straightforward because only foreclosure
and monopoly deviations need to be considered.
First of all, by plugging UEDki =∞ into DEV
F
hi, one obtains that in the
best foreclosure deviation manufacturer h earns 2ΠF ≤ ΠC . I now show that,
by undertaking monopoly deviations, no manufacturer can earn more than
2ΠF . Suppose manufacturer A wishes to deviate to (MA, ∅). Since manufac-
turer B offers UMB1 = 0 and thus leaves all surplus to retailer 2, manufacturer
A has to do the same in order to induce this retailer to carry exclusively
its product. This in turn implies that such deviations are never profitable.
If instead manufacturer A wishes to deviate to (∅,MA) then it can earn no
more than λΠM because manufacturer B sets UMB2 = λΠ
M . By construc-
tion, λ ≤ min{1, 2Π
F
ΠM
} which implies that λΠM ≤ 2ΠF . Since a similar
reasoning applies to manufacturer B’ monopoly deviations, proposition 3 is
established. 
D Equilibria in mixed configurations
In this section I consider the case when manufacturers are allowed to
submit negative bids.26 Let ΣMXh denote a contingent menu announced
by manufacturer h and let us start with the conditions that ensure that
(MA&MB,MA) is an equilibrium in g(Σ
MX
A ,Σ
MX
B ). First, it must be that
26The analysis of the case when bids are constrained to be non-negative is avalaible
upon request.
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if retailer 1 chooses to represent both manufacturers, retailer 2 prefers to
represent manufacturer A only, i.e.,
ΠMX − UMXA2 = max{0,Π
MX − UMXB2 ,Π
C − UCA2 − U
C
B2}.
Conversely, if retailer 2 chooses to represent manufacturer A, retailer 1 must
choose to represent both manufacturers, i.e.,
ΠMXAB − u
MX
A1 − v
MX
B1 = max{0,Π
ED − UEDB1 ,Π
F − UFA1}.
As before, the remaining payments must be chosen in a way that (i)
(MA&MB,MA) is the unique pure-strategy equilibrium of g(Σ
MX
A ,Σ
MX
B )
and (ii) all deviations are maximally deterred.
Similarly to the analysis of common agency equilibria, here it can be
shown that manufacturer h can undertake foreclosure deviations if and only
if DEVFh1 and DEV
F
h2 hold, exclusive dealing deviations if and only if
DEVED and DEVEDhi hold for at least some i and monopoly deviations
if and only if UEDki > Π
ED for at least some i. The only difference from the
previous analysis is that the mixed configuration must now be destroyed.
Likewise, all deviations to common agency, double common agency and the
other mixed configurations can also be fully deterred.
I now show that with negative bids manufacturers can deter all deviations
and fully extract each retailer’s surplus. To see this, suppose that each
manufacturer h offers the following menu ΣMXh :
• For h ∈ {A,B} : UCAhi = U
C
hi = ∞ for i = 1, 2 and U
MX
h1 = u
MX
h2 =
vMXh2 =∞.
• uMXA1 and v
MX
B1 are such that u
MX
A1 + v
MX
B1 = Π
MX
AB .
• For h = A: UMXA2 = Π
MX , UFA2 = Π
F − (1 + λ′)2ΠF , vMXA1 = U
F
A1 =
UEDA2 =∞, U
ED
A1 = Π
ED − 2ΠF , UMA1 = 0 and U
M
A1 = λΠ
M .
• For h = B: UEDB2 = Π
ED − 2ΠF , UFB1 = Π
F − (1 + λ′)2ΠF , UMXB2 =
uMXB1 = U
F
B2 = U
ED
B2 =∞, U
M
B1 = λΠ
M and UMB2 = 0 where λ ∈ (0, 1)
and λ′ > 0 and sufficiently large.
Intuitively, the negative exclusive dealing offers serve to fully deter fore-
closure deviations while the negative foreclosure offers serve to ensure the
uniqueness of the (MA&MB,MA) continuation equilibrium in the game
g(ΣMXA ,Σ
MX
B ) which is represented by Table 2.
[Insert Table 2 here]
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Using Table 2, one can easily check that (MA&MB,MA) is the unique
pure-strategy equilibrium in which manufacturers jointly earn ΠMXAB +Π
MX .
I now show that there are no profitable deviations for either manufac-
turer. As before, one needs to consider monopoly, exclusive dealing and
foreclosure deviations only.
Let us start with manufacturer A. Consider, first, its monopoly devia-
tions to (MA, ∅) and (∅,MA). Since manufacturer B sets U
ED
B2 < 0, devia-
tions to (MA, ∅) are impossible. In contrast, since U
ED
B2 =∞, manufacturer
A can deviate to (∅,MA) in which case it earns no more thanmin{U
M
B2,Π
M}.
However, given that manufacturer B sets UMB2 = 0, such deviations are never
profitable.
Consider now manufacturerA’s exclusive dealing deviations to (MB,MA)
and (MB,MA). Since U
ED
B1 =∞, deviations to (MB,MA) are impossible. In
contrast, since UEDB2 < 0, manufacturer A can deviate to (MA,MB). How-
ever, because manufacturer B sets UFB1 = Π
F−(1+λ′)2ΠF where λ′ > 0 and
large it can only loose from such deviations. Indeed, as DEVEDA1 implies, in
that case manufacturer A would earn
U˜EDA1 ≤ min{Π
ED,ΠED − (ΠF − UFB1)}
= ΠED − (1 + λ′)2ΠF < 0 for λ′ > 0 and large.
Consider, finally, manufacturer A’s foreclosure deviations to (MA,MA).
By plugging the conditions UEDB1 =∞ and U
ED
B2 = Π
ED−2ΠF into DEVFA1
and DEVFA2, one finds that in any such deviation manufacturer A earns
U˜FA1 + U˜
F
A2 ≤ min{Π
F ,ΠF − (ΠED − UEDB1 )}+min{Π
F ,ΠF − (ΠED − UEDB2 )}
= ΠF −ΠF = 0.
This shows that there are no profitable deviations for manufacturer A.
One can verify that a similar reasoning applies to manufacturer B. Thus,
the proposed menus ΣMXA and Σ
MX
B indeed constitute an equilibrium of G.
E Exclusive dealing equilibria
Let ΣEDh denote a contingent menu announced by manufacturer h. First
of all, notice that if manufacturer h sets UCAhi = U
C
hi = u
MX
hi = v
MX
hi =∞ for
i = 1, 2 then manufacturer k cannot gain by making the offers which allow
common representation. In which case, bidding between manufactures is
reduced to competition to obtain exclusive relationship with each retailer.
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LEMMA 3. When manufacturers are constrained by limited liability,
exclusive dealing equilibria exist only if ΠED ≥ ΠF .
Proof. Suppose that the proposed menus ΣEDA and Σ
ED
B induce the
retailer game g(ΣEDA ,Σ
ED
B ) that has (MA,MB) as an equilibrium which in
turn implies that the following conditions must hold:
ΠED − UEDA1 ≥ max{0,Π
F − UFB1} and Π
ED − UEDB2 ≥ max{0,Π
F − UFA2}.
That is, if retailer 2 represents manufacturer B then retailer 1 must
choose to represent manufacturer A and vice versa.
Consider now foreclosure deviations of manufacturer h. In which case it
offers the following menu Σ˜Fh :
• U˜Fhi ≤ Π
F −max{0,ΠED − UEDki } for i = 1, 2.
• The other payments of Σ˜Fh coincide with those of Σ
ED
h .
Since in any equilibrium the retailers must be willing to accept the ex-
clusive offers then it must be UEDA1 , U
ED
B2 ≤ Π
ED. Hence, in any foreclosure
deviation manufacturer A earns at most
U˜FA1 + U˜
F
A2 ≤ 2Π
F − (ΠED − UEDB2 )−max{0,Π
ED − UEDB1 },
while manufacturer B earns at most
U˜FB1 + U˜
F
B2 ≤ 2Π
F − (ΠED − UEDA1 )−max{0,Π
ED − UEDA2 }.
Since in any equilibrium all deviations must be deterred, the following
conditions must hold:
2ΠF − (ΠED − UEDB2 )−max{0,Π
ED − UEDB1 } ≤ U
ED
A1 , E1
2ΠF − (ΠED − UEDA1 )−max{0,Π
ED − UEDA2 } ≤ U
ED
B2 . E2
Taken together, E1 and E2 imply
2(2ΠF −ΠED)−max{0,ΠED − UEDB1 } −max{0,Π
ED − UEDA2 } ≤ 0. E3
Suppose that in equilibrium UEDB1 , U
ED
A2 ≥ Π
ED. In which case E3 boils
down to ΠED ≥ 2ΠF . Suppose now that UEDB1 ≥ Π
ED and UEDA2 < Π
ED (a
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similar arguments applies if UEDB1 < Π
ED and UEDA2 ≥ Π
ED). In which case
E3 boils down to (4ΠF−3ΠED)+UEDA2 ≤ 0.When the manufacturers are con-
strained by limited liability, then UEDA2 ≥ 0 and therefore the above condition
can be satisfied only if 3ΠED ≥ 4ΠF . Finally, suppose that UEDB1 , U
ED
A2 <
ΠED. In this case E3 boils down to 4(ΠF − ΠED) + UEDB1 + U
ED
A2 ≤ 0.
Again, because of limited liability the latter condition can be satisfied only
if ΠED ≥ ΠF . Taken together, these results imply that in any exclusive deal-
ing equilibrium at least the condition ΠED ≥ ΠF must be satisfied. This
proves lemma 4. 
I now show that ΠED > ΠF is also a sufficient condition (the case
ΠED = ΠF is discussed below). In fact, in this case the game gives rise
to multiplicity of exclusive dealing equilibria. It turns out that it is possible
to construct the equilibria in which manufacturers extract each retailer’s sur-
plus. To establish this point, I actually find such an equilibrium. Consider
the following menu ΣEDh offered by manufacturer h:
• UCAhi = U
C
hi = u
MX
hi = v
MX
hi = U
MX
hi =∞ for i = 1, 2.
• For h = A: UEDA1 = Π
ED, UEDA2 = 2(Π
ED − ΠF ), UFA1 = 0, U
F
A2 = ∞,
UMA1 = λΠ
M and UMA2 = 0. For h = B: U
ED
B1 = 2(Π
ED −ΠF ), UEDB2 =
ΠED, UFB1 =∞, U
F
B2 = 0, U
M
B1 = 0 and U
M
B2 = λΠ
M where λ ∈ (0, λ).
λ = 1 if ΠED < 2ΠF and λ = min{1, Π
ED
ΠM
} otherwise.
When manufacturers announce such ΣEDA and Σ
ED
B , the number of possi-
ble configurations to consider is reduced from sixteen to nine. Table 3 repre-
sents the payoff matrix obtained from g(ΣEDA ,Σ
ED
B ) by deletion of the (dom-
inated) strategies which involve common representation, i.e., si =MA&MB
for i = 1, 2.
[Insert Table 3 here]
As Table 3 shows, (MA,MB) is the unique equilibrium in the game
g(ΣEDA ,Σ
ED
B ) in which each manufacturer earns Π
ED. It remains to verify
that no manufacturer can gain by deviating. This is straightforward because
only foreclosure and monopoly deviations need to be considered.
To begin, consider foreclosure deviations of manufacturer A. Since man-
ufacturer B sets UEDB1 = 2(Π
ED − ΠF ) and UEDB2 = Π
ED, then by plugging
these conditions into DEVFA1 and DEV
F
A2, one obtains that manufacturer
A then earns
U˜FA1 + U˜
F
A2 ≤ [Π
F −max{0, 2ΠF −ΠED}] + ΠF
= min{ΠED, 2ΠF} ≤ ΠED.
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Hence, it cannot gain from such deviations.
Consider now manufacturer A’s monopoly deviations to (MA, ∅) and
(∅,MA) . Note that, since manufacturer B sets U
ED
B2 = Π
ED, manufacturer
A to deviate to (MA, ∅) and earn at most U
M
B1. Given that U
M
B1 = 0, such
deviations are never profitable.
While considering manufacturer A’s deviations to (∅,MA) , I distinguish
two cases which follow from the sign of ΠED−UEDB1 = Π
ED−2ΠF . If ΠED <
2ΠF then deviations to (∅,MA) are impossible. In contrast, if Π
ED ≥ 2ΠF
then such deviations are possible and in the best deviation of such a kind
manufacturer A earns UMB2 = λΠ
M . By construction, λ ≤ λ = min{1, Π
ED
ΠM
}
which implies that λΠM ≤ ΠED. Taken together, these results imply that
manufacturer A cannot gain from such deviations either.
By applying a similar reasoning, one can verify that manufacturer B
cannot gain from monopoly and foreclosure deviations either. Thus, the
proposed strategies ΣEDA and Σ
ED
B indeed constitute an equilibrium.
To complete the analysis, consider the case when ΠED = ΠF . This con-
dition is not sufficient to implement the exclusive dealing configuration,
(MA,MB) , as the unique equilibrium.
27 The main problem in this case
is that it is impossible to ensure that all foreclosure deviations be deterred
and, at the same time, (MB,MA) do not be an equilibrium. Indeed, all
foreclosure deviations can be deterred only if E3 can be satisfied. When
ΠED = ΠF E3 boils down to min{ΠED, UEDB1 }+min{Π
ED, UEDA2 } ≤ 0 which
is possible only if UEDB1 = U
ED
A2 = 0. In that case, in order to destroy the
(MB,MA) equilibrium, manufacturers must offer negative foreclosure offers,
i.e., UFA1, U
F
B2 < 0, which they cannot do because of limited liability. Alter-
natively, manufacturers could allow a retailer to accept both offers. However,
this could help destroy the (MB,MA) equilibrium only if Π
MX
AB > Π
ED.
Remark. It has been show that because of limited liability manufac-
turers cannot fully deter all foreclosure deviations. Consequently, exclusive
dealing equilibria cannot be sustained when ΠF ≥ ΠED. However, if this as-
sumption were relaxed, such equilibria could be sustained even if ΠF ≥ ΠED.
To see this, suppose that each manufacturer h announces the following menu
ΣEDh :
• UCAhi = U
C
hi = u
MX
hi = v
MX
hi = U
MX
hi =∞ for i = 1, 2.
• For h = A: UEDA1 = Π
ED, UEDA2 = 2(Π
ED − ΠF ), UFA1 = Π
F − (1 +
27As Table 4 shows, when ΠED = ΠF the game g(ΣEDA ,Σ
ED
B ) has two exclusive dealing
equilibria (MA,MB) and (MB,MA) . In the former one, both manufacturers earn Π
ED
while in the latter one they earn zero.
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λ′)(2ΠF − ΠED), UFA2 = ∞, U
M
A1 = λΠ
M and UMA2 = 0. For h = B:
UEDB1 = 2(Π
ED − ΠF ), UEDB2 = Π
ED, UFB1 = ∞, U
F
B2 = Π
F − (1 +
λ′)(2ΠF −ΠED), UMB1 = 0 and U
M
B2 = λΠ
M where λ, λ′ ∈ (0, 1).
The difference between these menus and those offered when ΠED > ΠF
is that now UEDA2 , U
ED
B1 < 0 and U
F
A1, U
F
B2 < 0. Manufacturers should offer
negative exclusive dealing payments in order to fully deter foreclosure de-
viations while negative foreclosure payments serve to ensure the uniqueness
of the (MA,MB) continuation equilibrium. As before, one can easily verify
that no manufacturer can gain by deviating which in turn implies that ΣEDA
and ΣEDB are equilibrium strategies.
F Foreclosure equilibria
In this case manufacturers compete to sign up both retailers into exclu-
sive relationship. Given that retailers make their decisions non-cooperatively,
this basically implies competition for having a particular foreclosure config-
uration to be the unique continuation equilibrium.
Let ΣFh denote a contingent menu offered by manufacturer h. Follow-
ing the analysis of exclusive dealing equilibria, in constructing foreclosure
equilibria, one can restrict attention on the strategies under which each
manufacturer h ∈ {A,B} sets UCAhi = U
C
hi = u
MX
hi = v
MX
hi =∞ for i = 1, 2.
Next, in any foreclosure equilibrium the following conditions must hold:
ΠF − UFhi = max{0,Π
ED − UEDki } where h = k, F1
for i = 1, 2. In words, if retailer j represents manufacturer h then it must
be that retailer i chooses to represent manufacturer h as well.
LEMMA 4. Foreclosure equilibria exist only if ΠF ≥ ΠED.
Proof. Suppose that ΠED > ΠF and UFhi, U
ED
ki satisfy F1 for i = 1, 2
and h ∈ {A,B}. It is easy to check that the corresponding retailer game then
has two equilibria (MA,MA) and (MB,MB) . In what follows I distinguish
two cases.
In the first case, manufacturer h obtains a strictly positive payoff, i.e.,
UFh1 +U
F
h2 > 0, when retailers choose to represent manufacturer h only, i.e.,
when the (Mh,Mh) continuation equilibrium is realized.
28 Suppose now that
it deviates and sets U˜EDhi < Π
ED − (ΠF −UFki) for i = 1, 2 (while keeping all
28Clearly, manufacturer h obtains zero when retailers choose to represent its rival only,
i.e., when the (Mk,Mk) continuation equilibrium is realized.
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other payments unchanged).29 Such deviation are at least weakly profitable
because, by doing so, manufacturer h destroys the (Mk,Mk) continuation
equilibrium of its rival and instead induces the (Mh,Mh) continuation equi-
librium to be unique.
In the second case, manufacturer h obtains zero even when the (Mh,Mh)
continuation equilibrium is realized, i.e., UFh1 = U
F
h2 = 0.As F1 implies, when
ΠED > ΠF this is possible only if UEDki = Π
ED − ΠF for i = 1, 2. In this
case, manufacturer h can always profitably deviate to exclusive dealing by
setting U˜EDhi < Π
ED−ΠF and U˜Fhi =∞ for i = 1, 2. By doing so, it destroys
the foreclosure continuation equilibria, i.e., (Mh,Mh) and (Mk,Mk), and
instead induces exclusive dealing continuation equilibria, i.e., (MA,MB) and
(MB,MA) , in either of which it obtains strictly positive payoff U˜
ED
hi . 
Suppose now thatΠF > ΠED and manufacturers face the limited liability
constraint. In order to construct a foreclosure equilibrium, one needs to take
into account bidding competition between manufacturers. Namely, given
that manufacturer k always seeks to destroy the continuation equilibrium of
its rival, i.e., (Mh,Mh), by offering U
ED
k1 = U
ED
k2 = 0, manufacturer h must
set UFhi ≤ Π
F −ΠED for i = 1, 2. Only in that case, both retailers then have
incentives to serve exclusively manufacturer h.
Next, when retailers decide non-cooperatively which manufacturer to rep-
resent, manufacturer h cannot induce them to select the desired foreclosure
equilibrium, (Mh,Mh), even if it lowers U
F
hi for at least some i. This ob-
servation, coupling with the fact that UFhi ≤ Π
F − ΠED for i = 1, 2, im-
plies that in any foreclosure equilibrium each manufacturer h optimally sets
UFhi = Π
F −ΠED −  for i = 1, 2 where  > 0 and small.
To complete the proof, one needs to show that such an equilibrium indeed
exists. To see this, suppose that each manufacturer h offers the following
menu ΣFh :
• UCAhi = U
C
hi = u
MX
hi = v
MX
hi = U
MX
hi =∞ for i = 1, 2.
• UMhi = 0, U
ED
hi = 0 and U
F
hi = Π
F − ΠED −  for i = 1, 2 where  > 0
and small.
By construction, the continuation game has only two equilibria, (MA,MA)
and (MB,MB) . Furthermore, in the (Mh,Mh) equilibrium manufacturer h
earns 2(ΠF −ΠED−) while manufacturer k earns zero. It remains to check
that there is no profitable deviation for either manufacturer.
29Note that when ΠED > ΠF such deviation is possible even if manufacturer h is
constrained by limited liability.
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Deviations to any configuration which involves common representation
can never be profitable because each manufacturer insist on exclusivity.
Monopoly deviations are impossible because each retailer is always ready
to accept the exclusive dealing offer of a rival manufacturer. Exclusive deal-
ing deviations cannot be profitable because a manufacturer then has to offer
the payoff which is larger than ΠED. Finally, no manufacturer h can prof-
itably increase its foreclosure payments because in that case the (Mh,Mh)
equilibrium will be destroyed and (Mk,Mk) will be instead the unique con-
tinuation equilibrium. This proves proposition 6.
Remark. When ΠF > ΠED but negative bids are allowed the menus
ΣFA and Σ
F
B no longer constitute an equilibrium. Recall that Σ
F
A and Σ
F
B give
rise to two equilibria, (MA,MA) and (MB,MB), and only in the (Mh,Mh)
equilibrium manufacturer h earns a positive profit. When bids are uncon-
strained manufacturer h could deviate from ΣFh by offering U˜
ED
hi < 0 and
U˜Mhi < 0 for i = 1, 2 (while keeping all other payments unchanged). It is
easy to verify that in this case si =Mh would be a strictly dominant strat-
egy for each retailer i = 1, 2 and, as a result, manufacturer h would earn
2(ΠF −ΠED−) with probability one. Clearly, such deviations will never be
profitable only if each manufacturer earns zero even in the event both retail-
ers choose to represent this manufacturer. As a consequence, in equilibrium
each manufacturer h offers the following payments:
• UCAhi = U
C
hi = u
MX
hi = v
MX
hi = U
MX
hi =∞ for i = 1, 2.
• UMhi = U
F
hi = 0 and U
ED
hi = −(Π
F −ΠED − ) for i = 1, 2.
G Non-contingent offers
Suppose, for example, that manufacturers wish to implement double
common agency as a continuation equilibrium in which case they must make
the offers which satisfy the following constraints:
ΠC − UAi − UBi ≥ max{0,Π
MX − UAi,Π
MX − UBi}, G1
for i = 1, 2. Let ΠC < 2ΠMX then in any such equilibrium each retailer
must earn some rent. From G1 it then follows that it must be UAi, UBi ≤
ΠC − ΠMX for i = 1, 2 which in turn implies that double common agency
equilibria exist only if ΠC ≥ ΠMX . This condition, however, does not imply
that double common agency can always be implemented as an equilibrium
whenever it is most efficient. For example, this is not the case when
ΠC −ΠMXAB > Π
MX −ΠC > 0.
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To illustrate the difficulties related to the uniqueness of an equilibrium,
suppose, for example, that the following conditions hold:
ΠED −ΠMXAB > Π
C −ΠMX > ΠED −ΠF > 0,
and
2(ΠC −ΠMX) ≥ ΠCA −ΠM .
Suppose again that manufacturers wish to sustain a double common
agency equilibrium which implies that manufacturers’ bids must not exceed
ΠC−ΠMX . Note that, since the offers are non-contingent, then in any exclu-
sive dealing configuration each retailer i earns ΠED − Uhi ≥ Π
ED − (ΠC −
ΠMX) > 0. This in turn gives rise to the possibility for these configura-
tions to be continuation equilibria as well. Therefore, in order to ensure the
uniqueness of the double common agency equilibrium, all other equilibria
must be destroyed.
There are two ways to do it. The first is to induce (at least) one re-
tailer to represent both manufacturers whenever the other retailer chooses
to represent only one. This is possible only if
ΠMXAB − Uhi − Uki > Π
ED − Uhi,
for at least some i. This implies that manufacturer k must then pay Uki <
−(ΠED − ΠMXAB ) to retailer i. However, given that in any double common
agency equilibrium it earns at most ΠC −ΠMX < ΠED −ΠMXAB in outlet j,
it will never make such offers.
The second way is to induce the game in which one retailer tries to ‘catch’
the other, i.e., whenever, say, retailer 1 chooses to represent manufacturer h
then so does retailer 2, however, in this case retailer 1 will instead prefer to
represent manufacturer k. This implies that the following conditions must
hold:
ΠED − Uh1 > Π
F − Uk1 and Π
F − Uh2 > Π
ED − Uk2,
for k = h. However, they are impossible to satisfy. Indeed, if ΠED ≥ ΠF
then the conditions ΠF − UA2 > Π
ED − UB2 and Π
F − UB2 > Π
ED − UA2
are incompatible while if ΠED < ΠF then the same is true for the conditions
ΠED−UA1 > Π
F −UB1 and Π
ED−UB1 > Π
F −UA1. Taken together, these
results imply that double common agency cannot be implemented as the
unique continuation equilibrium.
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It remains to show that such an equilibrium indeed exists. For this,
suppose that each manufacturer h offers Uhi = Π
C − ΠMX for i = 1, 2.
Given that ΠED−ΠF > 0, it is easy to check that the corresponding retailer
game has three equilibria: one is the double common agency configuration
and the other two are the exclusive dealing configurations. Assuming that
the retailers always choose the double common agency equilibrium (which
means that each manufacturer then earns 2(ΠC −ΠMX)), let us verify that
no manufacturer have incentives to deviate.
First, monopoly deviations are impossible because each manufacturer h
sets Uhi < Π
ED for i = 1, 2.
Second, deviations to mixed configurations are impossible either. Indeed,
manufacturer h can undertake such deviations only if it offers U˜hi which
satisfies the following constraint:
ΠMXAB − U˜hi − Uki ≥ max{Π
ED − Uki,Π
F − U˜hi} > 0, G2
where Uki = Π
C−ΠMX < ΠED. If U˜hi > (Π
C−ΠMX)−(ΠED−ΠF ) > 0 then
G2 boils down to ΠMXAB − U˜hi − Uki ≥ Π
ED − Uki or U˜hi ≤ −(Π
ED −ΠMXAB )
which is obviously contradiction. If instead U˜hi ≤ (Π
C−ΠMX)−(ΠED−ΠF )
then G2 down to ΠMXAB − U˜hi−Uki ≥ Π
F − U˜hi or Uhi ≤ Π
MX
AB −Π
F which is
also contradiction because Uhi > 0 while, by supposition, Π
F > ΠMXAB . This
implies that no such deviation is possible.
Third, common agency deviations are never profitable because, by sup-
position, 2(ΠC −ΠMX) ≥ ΠCA −ΠM .
Forth, exclusive dealing deviations are never profitable. Indeed, in any
such deviation manufacturer h earns
U˜hi ≤ Π
ED −ΠF + Uki = (Π
ED −ΠF ) + (ΠC −ΠMX).
By supposition, ΠED − ΠF < ΠC − ΠMX and therefore manufacturer h
cannot gain from such deviations.
Finally, since ΠED > ΠF foreclosure deviations are never profitable since
in this case a deviating manufacturer earns at most 2(ΠC−ΠMX)−2(ΠED−
ΠF ).
Note that in this example I have not used the condition that double
common agency is most efficient. Likewise, it can easily be verified that
even if it is and all other things are equal in this example then it may not
be the unique continuation equilibrium.
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